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Abstract
This Comment assesses the marine archaeology provisions of UNCLOS III and argues that the
principles embodied in U.S. abandoned shipwreck law may significantly contribute to cooperative
efforts that determine the future of shipwrecks found in international waters. Part I compares the
existing legal framework of international marine archaeology established by UNCLOS III with
U.S. law on abandoned historic shipwrecks. Part II presents commentators’ interpretations of the
Convention’s marine archaeology provisions. Part II emphasizes these commentators’ views on
the ability of a nation to obtain jurisdiction over shipwreck recovery operations in international
waters and whether nations should apply principles of salvage and finds to these efforts. Part III
argues that UNCLOS III should be broadly interpreted to better reflect the U.S. view that salvage
and finds law is inappropriate for historic shipwrecks. Finally, Part III proposes a legal structure
for the treatment of historic shipwrecks found beyond domestic jurisdiction.
COMMENTS
THE LAW OF THE SEA AND INTERNATIONAL MARINE
ARCHAEOLOGY: ABANDONING ADMIRALTY LAW
TO PROTECT HISTORIC SHIPWRECKS
INTRODUCTION
Current international law does not adequately deal with
marine archaeology.' Specifically, international law does not en-
sure for public benefit the preservation of historically significant
shipwrecks, which are a major component of marine archaeo-
logical finds.2 Because historic shipwrecks have educational, rec-
reational, and cultural value and contribute to our understand-
ing of history, it is in the public's interest to make certain that
these resources are not jeopardized.' Preservation of historic
shipwrecks found in international waters requires a legal regime
1. James A.R. Nafziger, Finding the Titanic: Beginning an International Salvage of Dere-
lict Law at Sea, 12 CoLum.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 339, 339 (1988); Douglas B. Shalicross &
Anne G. Giesecke, Recent Developments in Litigation Concerning the Recovery of Historic Ship-
wrecks, 10 SYRACUSEJ. INT'L L. & Com. 371, 402 (1983); SusanJ. Lindbloom, Note, His-
toric Shipwreck Legislation: Rescuing the Titanic from the Law of the Sea, 13J. LECis. 92, 92
(1986).
There are two sources for international law, treaties and custom. SHABTAi
ROSENNE, PRlAcTCE AND METHODS OF INTERNATioNAL LAw 14 (1984). Treaties establish
conventional international law. Id. Customary international law, in contrast, does not
rest on a treaty basis. Id. Customary international law is derived from the generally
accepted conduct of nations acting with the belief that the law required them to behave
in that way. Id. at 55. The International Court of justice considers customary interna-
tional law to be "international custom, [and] evidence of a general practice accepted as
law." Statute of the International Court ofJustice,June 26, 1945, art. 38, § 1 (b), 59 Stat.
1055, 1060, 3 Bevans 1179, 1187.
Marine archaeology is defined as the scientific study of the material remains of past
human life and activities relating to the sea and navigation of the sea. Leonard D.
DuBoff, Introduction: Symposium Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association of Ameri-
can Law Schools' Section on Art Law, 12 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARrs 335, 335 n.1 (1988)
(citation omitted). The study of shipwrecks with historic or archaeological significance
with the aim of preserving them is considered a part of the broader discipline of marine
archaeology. Id. at 335.
2. See DuBoff, supra note 1, at 335 ("In the simplest sense ... marine archaeology
refers to the study of shipwrecks.").
3. See Shallcross & Giesecke, supra note 1, at 371-73. Preserving historic shipwrecks
is in the public interest. See id. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
New York City's local historic preservation law partly because historic preservation has
an important public purpose. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104 (1978). The Court stated that the destruction of historic properties has occurred
without considering their important values. Id. at 108. The Court also found that pres-
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that combines regulation of recovery operations with incentives
to search for and locate shipwrecks.4
Several countries independently have passed statutes that
regulate abandoned shipwrecks of historic or archaeological
value found within their jurisdiction.5 The United States has
done so through the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987 (the
"ASA").6 The ASA treats historic abandoned shipwrecks in the
broader context of the U.S. national historic preservation pro-
gram. 7 While the passage of these laws reflects domestic con-
ervation of objects with special historic, cultural, or architectural significance enhances
the quality of life for all citizens. Id.
While there is a public benefit in historic preservation generally, there are also
groups that take special interest in shipwrecks. See Shallcross & Giesecke, supra note 1,
at 371-73. Sport divers value historic shipwrecks' recreational attributes. Id. at 371;
Moyer v. The Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, Known As The Andrea Doria, 836 F. Supp.
1099 (D.N.J. 1993). For the sport diver, exploring sunken wrecks enhances a diving
experience. Shallcross & Giesecke, supra note 1, at 371. While sport divers use ship-
wrecks for their recreational value, archaeologists use shipwrecks to reconstruct the
past. Id. at 371-73. The information gained by the archaeologist may be disseminated
to augment the public's understanding of former societies. Id. As of 1983, there were
about two million sport divers and thousands of individual members of historic preser-
vation and archaeology organizations. Id. at 371 n.1.
In comparison to the sport diver's and archaeologist's interest in shipwrecks, the
professional treasure salvor's motivation is primarily economic. Id. at 371. The trea-
sure salvor's goal is to spend the least amount of money to recover valuable artifacts
from sunken wrecks such as gold, silver, and other precious metals. Id. The number of
professional treasure salvage companies is relatively much smaller than the number of
sport divers and preservation constituents. Id. at 371 n.1. Approximately twenty profes-
sional salvage companies existed in the United States in 1983. Id. As a result of ignor-
ing the archaeological value of shipwrecks, professional treasure salvors may destroy the
information archaeologists appreciate. Id. at 372. But see, Melvin A. Fisher, The Aban-
doned Shipwreck Act: The Role of Private Enterprise, 12 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARis 373, 376-77
(1988) (stating that at least one professional treasure salvage company has established
non-profit organization to operate shipwreck museum and to publish and disseminate
archaeological information to interested persons).
4. See H. Peter Del Bianco, Note, Underwater Recovery Operations in Offshore Waters:
Vying for Rights to Treasure, 5 B.U. INT'L L.J. 153, 172 (1987) (stating that two guiding
policies for international marine archaeology should be to provide favorable incentives
to locate and recover lost shipwrecks and to maximize protection for archaeologically
significant objects resting on ocean floor).
5. See Alexander Korthals Altes, Submarine Antiquities: A Legal Labyrinth, 4 SYRACUSE
J. INT'L L. & CoM. 77, 84-93 (1976) (surveying relevant shipwreck laws in United King-
dom, Australia, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Denmark and Norway); Timothy J.
Runyan, Shipwreck Legislation and the Preservation of Submerged Artifacts, 22 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 31, 40-41 (1990) (discussing Canadian abandoned shipwreck law).
6. Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987 ("ASA"), 43 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2106 (1988).
7. See Abandoned Shipwreck Act Guidelines, 55 Fed. Reg. 50,116 (Dec. 4, 1990)
[hereinafter Guidelines]. The Secretary of the Interior published the Guidelines pursu-
ant to § 2104 of the ASA. Id.; see also Anne Giesecke, The Abandoned Shipwreck Act: Af-
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cern with safeguarding shipwrecks, shipwrecks found in interna-
tional waters continue to be unprotected.'
This discrepancy is problematic because the increased
sophistication of undersea technology has allowed pro-
fessional treasure salvors to extend salvage operations beyond
a country's jurisdiction to the deeper and less accessible
portions of the oceans.9 As more shipwrecks are found in
international waters, unregulated salvage attempts could
threaten an increasing number of historic shipwrecks.'" Con-
firming the Role of the States in Historic Preservation, 12 CoLuM.-VLAJ.L. & ARrs 379, 382-83
(1988) (explaining that one purpose of ASA was to coordinate states' historic preserva-
tion duties).
8. See Bernard H. Oxman, Marine Archaeology and the International Law of the Sea, 12
COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 353, 357 (1988) (regime of high seas includes marine archae-
ology as high seas freedom); Anthony Clark Arend, Note, Archaeological and Historical
Objects: The International Legal Implications of UNCLOS III, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 777, 786
(1982) (interpretation of high seas freedoms includes archaeological exploration); see
also Anastasia Strati, Deep Seabed Cultural Property and the Common Heritage of Mankind, 40
INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 859, 870 (1991) (flag state jurisdiction is inadequate for protecting
underwater cultural heritage).
A nation has jurisdiction over vessels flying its flag. THOMASJ. SCHOENBAUM, ADMi-
RALTY AND MARITIME LAw 40 (1987). Flag state jurisdiction enables the flag state to
carry out its responsibility to ensure that ships comply with international duties con-
cerning safety of navigation, protection of life at sea, protection of the marine environ-
ment, and other administrative, technical, and social matters. Id. While flag state juris-
diction could allow a state to apply its own laws to a historic shipwreck, it may not
resolve complex issues of ownership like the problem surrounding the Titanic. See
Nafziger, supra note 1, at 33941 (1988). Even though the ship was flying the British
flag, U.S. and French explorers led the expedition to find the wreck and its passengers
were from many different nations. Id.
9. See William J. Broad, Deepest Wrecks Now Visible to Undersea Cameras, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 2, 1993, at C1. The new technologies include deep-diving robots and unmanned
submersibles equipped with advanced cameras, lights, and lasers. Id. Because these
technologies aid salvage operations and also archaeological documentation, they pro-
vide an alternative to the destruction of shipwrecks by salvage and treasure hunting. Id.
The new technologies also divide salvage companies and preservationists because the
photographs could help treasure hunters determine where to cut apart a shipwreck. Id.
Alternatively, the photographs could be used to sensitively dismember a wreck while
simultaneously documenting it. Id. See generally Drew F.T. Horrell, Telepossession is Nine-
Tenths of the Law: The Emerging Industry of Deep Ocean Discovery, 3 PACE Y.B. Ir'L L. 309
(1991) (discussing new technologies used to retrieve sunken wrecks).
Salvage operations include efforts to recover objects lost at sea, including ship-
wrecks. See Del Bianco, supra note 4, at 153 n.1. In ancient times, nets, grappling
hooks, and skin divers were used to recover sunken items. Id. Twentieth century inven-
tions such as the self-contained underwater breathing apparatus ("SCUBA") has made
underwater exploration possible. Id. Also, the proton magnometer and metal detector
have assisted in the location of wrecks. Id. Similarly, the invention of sonar has ena-
bled the discovery of shipwrecks located under water. Id.
10. See, e.g., Columbus-America Discovery Group, Inc. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 974
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mentatorsi t are divided on whether the law of salvage"2 and
finds 3 adequately protect the public's interest in preserving his-
toric shipwrecks for their value as cultural property.14
F.2d 450, 455 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating that S.S. CentralAmerica located at distance of 160
miles offshore), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 1625 (1993); Marshall King, Admiralty
Law: Evolving Legal Treatment of Property Claims to Shipwrecks in International Waters, 31
HARv. INT'L L.J. 313, 317 n.35 (1990) (explaining that salvors located S.S. Central
America 160 miles of the coast of South Carolina); Cynthia Furrer Newton, Finders Keep-
ers? The Titanic and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, 10 HASTINGS INT'L & ComP. L.
REv. 159, 159-60 (1986) (discussing discovery of Titanic in international waters in early
1980's as example of impact of new technology on salvage operations on high seas);
William J. Broad, 1784 Spanish Ship is Found in Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1993, at 38
(reporting that ship El Cazador discovered by fishing vessel 50 miles off Louisiana coast
and recovered by use of sonar and underwater robot).
11. This Comment includes professional and student commentators' views on in-
ternational marine archaeology law. The professional commentators include: Bruce E.
Alexander (Semmes, Bowen & Semmes, Baltimore, Md.; Adjunct Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of Baltimore; member, Committee on Law of the Sea, Maritime Law Association
of the United States); James A.R. Nafziger (Professor of Law, Willamette University Col-
lege of Law); Bernard H. Oxman (Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law;
U.S. Representative and Vice-Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea; Chairman of the English Language Group
of the Conference Drafting Committee); Anastasia Strati (Research Officer, Institute of
Hellenic Studies, Athens). The student note writers include: Anthony Clark Arend
(University of Virginia School of Law); H. Peter Del Bianco (Boston University School
of Law); SusanJ. Lindbloom (Notre Dame Law School); Cynthia Furrer Newton (Has-
tings Law School).
12. See Columbus-America Discovery Group, 974 F.2d at 460-61. The admiralty princi-
ple of salvage law allows a plaintiff salvor to recover a reward from the owner of the
shipwreck. Id. The law of salvage developed out of the policy to encourage efforts to
save property from destruction and to discourage embezzlement. SCHOENBAUM, supra
note 8, at 500. A salvor may be any person, including a corporation or a governmental
agency, that performs an act of salvage. Id. at 506. A salvor must not have a preexisting
duty to carry out salvage, however. Id. An example of a preexisting duty is a duty from
a person's employment on a ship. Id. Firemen, pilots, and other public employees may
receive a salvage reward only where services are provided outside their official duties.
Id.
13. See David R. Owen, The Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987: Good-bye to Salvage in
the Territorial Sea, 19J. MAR. L. & COM. 499, 510 (1988). The law of finds is a common
law doctrine that has been applied in the maritime context since 1861. Id. Since 1960,
finds law appeared in admiralty cases as an "adjunct" to salvage law. See id. The applica-
tion of finds law to historic abandoned shipwrecks is a recent trend in the law. See
Columbus-America Discovery Group, 974 F.2d at 459-60. Under the law of finds, a court
may grant title to the salvor under the principle of "finders, keepers." Id. (quoting
Martha's Vineyard Scuba Headquarters v. The Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned
Steam Vessel, 833 F.2d 1059, 1065 (1st Cir. 1987)).
14. Compare Strati, supra note 8, at 872 n.37 (arguing that salvage law should not be
used for claims to shipwrecks by pointing out that salvor is profit-motivated and that
salvage operations may destroy archaeological site) with Bruce E. Alexander, Treasure
Salvage Beyond the Territorial Sea: An Assessment and Recommendations, 20 J. MAR. L. &
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There has been one effort to establish conventional"5 inter-
national rules regarding the recovery of historic shipwrecks
outside domestic territory.16 The United Nations Third Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea 17 ("UNCLOS III" or the "Conven-
tion") addressed abandoned shipwrecks in international
waters.' Its provisions on marine archaeology, however, are am-
biguous and therefore have been subject to different interpreta-
CoM. 1, 1 (1989) (arguing that courts should apply salvage law to claims to discovered
shipwrecks in order to protect priority of first salvor).
Commercial treasure salvors support the application of salvage and finds to aban-
doned historic shipwrecks because a salvage reward or title to the wreck provides a
valuable incentive to search for them. See Columbus-America Discovery Group, 974 F.2d at
454; Fisher, supra note 3, at 373 (arguing that Congress should not pass Abandoned
Shipwreck Act of 1987 because title to shipwrecks will be granted to individual states);
see also Douglas S. Cohen, Note, Should Noli Fofendi Apply to Sunken Ships?, 73 B.U. L.
REv. 193, 193 (1993) (arguing that law of finds best encourages salvage efforts). The
wreck in Columbus-America Discovery Group contained over U.S.$1 billion of gold, and a
court awarded 90% of it to the plaintiff salvors. See Salvagers Receive 90% of Treasure;
Insurers, 10%, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1993, at A22.
The view that salvage and finds do not protect historic shipwrecks notes that under
salvage and finds principles, title may vest in the finder of the shipwreck, precluding
public ownership and control of the wrecked vessel. See, e.g., Treasure Salvors, 569 F.2d
at 336-37 (explaining that under both salvage law and law of finds court may grant title
of vessel to salvor). Also, a salvor is not required to use recovery techniques that con-
sider the archaeological integrity of the shipwreck under traditional admiralty law. See
SCHOENBAUM, supra note 8, at 502 (stating that elements required for salvage law cause
of action include (1) marine peril; (2) services voluntarily rendered; and (3) success in
whole or in part). Because of the potential negative impact of these principles on his-
toric abandoned shipwrecks, U.S. law explicitly excludes historic shipwrecks from the
law of salvage and finds. ASA, 43 U.S.C. § 2106(a) (1988); cf Leeanna Izuel, Comment,
Property Owners' Constructive Possession of Treasure Trove: Rethinking Finders Keepers Rule, 38
UCLA L. REv. 1659 (1991) (arguing for modification of finds law in order to avoid
inconsistent results in award of title).
Historic shipwrecks may be considered within the broader context of cultural prop-
erty. See Strati, supra note 8, at 860. Under international law, cultural property is de-
fined as "property which.., is specifically designated by each [nation] as being of im-
portance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science .... " United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Convention on the Means of
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of
Cultural Property, art. 1, Nov. 4, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231, 234-36, reprinted in 10 I.L.M.
289, 289-90 (1971). For a discussion of the protection of cultural property, see gener-
ally Roger W. Mastalir, A Proposal for Protecting the "Cultural" and "Property" Aspects of Cul-
tural Property Under International Law, 16 FoR~miA Ir'L L.J. 1033 (1992-93).
15. See supra note I (explaining that conventional international law rests on treaty
basis).
16. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec, 10, 1982, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982), to enter into force Nov. 16,
1994 [hereinafter UNCLOS III].
17. Id.
18. See UNCLOS III, supra note 16, arts. 149 & 303, 21 I.L.M. at 1295 & 1326.
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tions.t 9 While the Convention viewed marine archaeology as an
important ocean law matter, it did not supply straightforward
rules for international marine archaeology. 20 Although the
United States has not ratified UNCLOS III, the Convention will
achieve treaty status in late 1994.21
This Comment assesses the marine archaeology provisions
of UNCLOS III and argues that the principles embodied in U.S.
abandoned shipwreck law may significantly contribute to cooper-
ative efforts that determine the future of shipwrecks found in
international waters. Part I compares the existing legal frame-
work of international marine archaeology established by UN-
CLOS III with U.S. law on abandoned historic shipwrecks. Part
II presents commentators' interpretations of the Convention's
marine archaeology provisions. Part II emphasizes these com-
mentators' views on the ability of a nation to obtain jurisdiction
over shipwreck recovery operations in international waters and
whether nations should apply principles of salvage and finds to
these efforts. Part III argues that UNCLOS III should be broadly
interpreted to better reflect the U.S. view that salvage and finds
law is inappropriate for historic shipwrecks. Finally, Part III pro-
19. Nafziger, supra note 1, at 346.
20. Id.
21. See James L. Malone, Freedom & Opportunities: Foundation for a Dynamic Oceans
Policy, DEP'T ST. BULL., Dec. 1984, at 76. The United States treats UNCLOS III as a
restatement of customary international law except for the provisions on deep seabed
mining. Id.; see supra note 17 (discussing U.S. rejection of UNCLOS III based on its
deep seabed mining provisions). It is likely that the United States will sign UNCLOS III
in the summer of 1994. Steven Greenhouse, U.S. Aides Report Compromise on Sea Mining,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1994, at A10. Because the United States has been able to modify
the provisions on seabed mining to make it less onerous for mining companies, the
United States no longer objects to the treaty. Id.
UNCLOS III required 60 ratifying votes to come into force. SCHOENBAUM, supra
note 8, at 22. On November 16, 1993, Guyana provided the sixtieth ratifying vote giving
UNCLOS III treaty status as of November 16, 1994. Telephone interview with Marc
LaBelle, United Nations Treaties Section (Feb. 28, 1994). The United States rejected
UNCLOS III over a decade ago for reasons unrelated to abandoned shipwrecks. See
United States Oceans Policy, Statement by President Reagan, 19 WKLY. COMPILATION
PRES. Doc. 383 (Mar. 10, 1983) (rejecting UNCLOS III because United States did not
agree with deep seabed mining provisions). Other nations such as Britain, Germany,
and Italy also rejected UNCLOS III for the same reason. David E. Pitt, U.S. Seeks to 'Fix'
Mining Provisions of Sea Treaty, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1993, at 3. Due to the disagreement
over deep seabed regime, sixty countries have joined in an effort in renegotiating the
deep seabed mining provisions to allow developing countries to share the wealth that
miners may recover. Id. Until it achieves treaty status, UNCLOS III is only recognized
as customary international law. Id.
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poses a legal structure for the treatment of historic shipwrecks
found beyond domestic jurisdiction.
I. MARINE ARCHAEOLOGY UNDER UNCLOS III COMPARED
WITH U.S. ABANDONED SHIPWRECK LAW
UNCLOS III and U.S. law differ as to marine archaeology. 22
UNCLOS III dealt with a plethora of ocean law issues, including
marine archaeology.2 3 The Convention allocated varying de-
grees of national2 * sovereignty to different maritime zones in in-
ternational waters.2 5 Additionally, the Convention included two
marine archaeology provisions 26 that provide guidance for devel-
oping substantive aspects of historic abandoned shipwreck law.
Finally, UNCLOS III included compulsory dispute settlement
provisions.2' These dispute settlement provisions aim to provide
a peaceful method of settling disputes that may arise with re-
spect to the interpretation and application of the Convention.29
U.S. abandoned shipwreck law, as compared with UNCLOS III's
international scope, applies only to shipwrecks located within
domestic jurisdiction of the United States. 0
A. UNCLOS III: Background and Maritime Zones
UNCLOS III is the last of a series of international negotia-
22. Compare ASA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2106 (1988) with-UNCLOS III, supra note 16,
arts. 149 & 303, 21 I.L.M. 1295 & 1326 (demonstrating differences between ASA and
UNCLOS III).
23. See Arend, supra note 8, at 777 n.1. UNCLOS III convened 160 nations to
develop a convention on numerous ocean law matters. Id.
24. See UNCLOS III, supra note 16, art. 1, 2, 21 I.L.M. at 1271 (referring to
nations as "States Parties"). UNCLOS III uses the term "State" to refer to nations that
have ratified the Convention. See id. As a result, the Convention uses the term "coastal
State" to refer to nations with a boundary on international waters. See, e.g., id., art. 2,
1, 21 I.L.M. at 1272.
25. Id. art. 2, 21 I.L.M. at 1271.
26. See id. arts. 149 & 303, 21 I.L.M. at 1295 & 1326.
27. See Oxman, supra note 8, at 355 (stating that law of sea supplies framework
pursuant to which states may collectively develop substantive law of marine archaeol-
ogy).
28. See UNCLOS III, supra note 16, arts. 186-191 & 279-299, 21 I.L.M. at 1306-08 &
1322-26.
29. See Louis B. Sohn, Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in Ocean Conflicts: Does UNCLOS
III Point the Way?, 46 LAw & CorEMp. PROBS. 195, 195 (1983).
30. See supra note 22 (comparing U.S. abandoned shipwreck law with UNCLOS III
marine archaeology provisions).
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tions dealing with the law of the sea."1 The first stage of negotia-
tions was the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea
("UNCLOS I").32 UNCLOS I created four treaties: the Conven-
tion on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,3 3 the Con-
vention on the Continental Shelf, 4 the Convention on the High
Seas,35 and the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the
Living Resources of the High Seas. 6 The United States ratified
these treaties in 1961.
In 1960, the United Nations ("U.N.") convened UNCLOS II
specifically to reach an international understanding regarding
the boundaries for the Territorial Sea.37 The Territorial Sea rep-
resents the territory over which a coastal nation may exercise ex-
clusive jurisdiction.3 8 The traditional three mile boundary for
the Territorial Sea 9 limited coastal nations' jurisdiction. UN-
31. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 8, at 22 (explaining that since World War II there
have been three international conferences on the law of the sea in 1958, 1960, and
1973-82).
32. See id. (explaining that first international discussions regarding ocean law mat-
ters was UNCLOS I).
33. Convention of the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
34. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S.
No. 5578,499 U.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter the Continental Shelf Convention]. The Conti-
nental Shelf Convention became effective law in the United States by passage of the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1988) ("OCSLA"). Trea-
sure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569 F.2d 330,
340 (5th Cir. 1978). Article 2 of the Continental Shelf Convention gives the coastal
nation sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural re-
sources. Id. at 339. According to comments of the International Law Commission,
however, shipwrecks are not considered "natural resources" pursuant to the Continen-
tal Shelf Convention or the OCSLA. Id. at 340 (citing U.N. GAOR, 11th Sess., Supp.
No. 9, at 42, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956)).
35. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29,1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200,
450 U.N.T.S. 82.
36. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.
37. U.N. Conference on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.13/C.1/SR.1 to SR.66, A/CONF.13/C.1/L.1 to L.168 (1960); see D.W. Bowett,
The Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 9 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 415, 421
(1960) (stating that UNCLOS II discussions involved increasing traditional three mile
limit of Territorial Sea to either six or twelve miles).
38. See UNCLOS III, supra note 16, art. 2, 21 I.L.M. at 1272.
39. See PHILIP C. JESSup, THE LAw OF TERRITORIAL WATERs AND MARITIME JURISDIC-
TION 5-6 (1927). Cornelius van Bynkershock, in his 1703 treatise, De Domino Marls Dis-
ertatio, suggested that the distance a cannon shot would travel from shore was an appro-
priate measure of the coastal nation's jurisdiction over the sea. Id. The cannon-shot
measure, calculated at a marine league, the equivalent to three geographical miles from
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CLOS II represented national efforts to gain control over a
larger area of coastal waters.40 UNCLOS II, however, was ad-
journed without coming to an agreement on the breadth of the
Territorial Sea.4" While the Territorial Sea was of high priority
to the international legal community during UNCLOS I and
UNCLOS II, in UNCLOS III there was greater concern regard-
ing the legal regime over the area the previous conferences
failed to address, the deep seabed.42 The deep seabed repre-
shore by the Italian jurist Galiani in 1782, gained support until it was universally ac-
cepted as the maximum distance over which a coastal nation could claim sovereignty.
Id. Since 1793, the Territorial Sea of the United States has been delineated at three
miles. Letter from Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson to British Minister Mr. Ham-
mond (Nov. 8, 1793), reprinted in 1 J. MooRE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 702-03
(1906). Mr. Jefferson reported that
[t]he President of the United States, thinking that, before it shall be finally
decided to what distance from our seashores the territorial protection of the
United States shall be exercised ... finds it necessary in the meantime to fix
provisionally on some distance for the present government of these ques-
tions.... Reserving, however, the ultimate extent of this for future delibera-
tion, the President gives instructions to the officers acting under his authority
to consider those heretofore given them as restrained for the present to the
distance of one sea league or three geographical miles from the sea-shores.
Id.
40. See Luc CuvvEas, OcEAN USES AND THEIR REGULATIONS 154 (1984). A U.S.-
Canada proposal to create a six-mile territorial sea combined with a fishery zone of an
additional six miles failed to obtain enough votes to pass at UNCLOS II. Id. at 150.
41. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 8, at 22.
42. SeeJon Van Dyke & Christopher Yuen, "Common Heritage" v. "Freedom of the High
Seas": Which Governs the Seabed?, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 493, 506 (1982) (stating that
UNCLOS I did not address deep seabed); see Bowett, supra note 37 (explaining that
essential purpose of UNCLOS II was to decide whether to extend Territorial Sea).
The deep seabed is technically called "The Area" and defined in UNCLOS III as
the "seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdic-
tion." UNCLOS III, supra note 16, art. 1, 1, 21 I.L.M. at 1271. The deep seabed is the
center of a controversy over how resources found there should be distributed. See Pitt,
supra note 17, at 3 (discussing efforts to renegotiate deep seabed mining provisions of
UNCLOS III).
The Convention was primarily concerned with the regime governing the mining of
manganese nodules in the deep seabed. See Van Dyke & Yuen, supra, at 496. Manga-
nese nodules are rocks that have a high mineral content and are valuable because they
contain nickel, copper, manganese, and cobalt. See id. at n.7. A position in favor of
international control over the ocean bed as the "common heritage of mankind" gained
support amount the developing nations. See SHIGERU ODA, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF
SEA RESOURCES XXvi (1989). Developing nations favored this approach because if man-
ganese nodules were the "common heritage," profits from the resources must be shared
with the rest of the world according to international standards. See Van Dyke & Yuen,
supra, at 497. Critics of this view, including the United States, argued that international
control and the concept of "common heritage of mankind" was founded on wishful
thinking, Third World avarice, and a serious philosophical misunderstanding of prop-
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sents the area of international waters beyond national jurisdic-
tion.45
In order to confer on the deep seabed, the U.N. General
Assembly created the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the
Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Ju-
risdiction (the "Seabed Committee") in 1968.44 UNCLOS III
continued the Seabed Committee's work when it convened in
1973 .41 The Convention addressed specifically the regime of the
deep seabed, yet also provided a comprehensive set of rules on
navigation, fishing rights, environmental protection, and scien-
tific research.46 In addition, UNCLOS III resolved the breadth
of the Territorial Sea.47
UNCLOS III apportioned the oceans into maritime zones.48
The Convention divided international waters into the Territorial
Sea,49 the Contiguous Zone,50 the Exclusive Economic Zone,5
erty rights and of the true common heritage of humanity. See BERNARD H. OxmAN, LAw
OF THE SEA: U.S. POLICY AND DiLmMmA 6 (1983). These critics believed that there was a
'ploy' to permit Third World countries to reap the profits from industrialized countries'
efforts at deep seabed exploration. See id. In particular, production limitation,
mandatory transfer of some technologies, and a built-in preference for public over pri-
vate enterprise of deep seabed mining went against U.S. and industrialized countries'
economic interests. See id.
43. See UNCLOS III, supra note 16, art. 1, 1, 21 I.L.M. at 1261.
44. G.A. Res. 2467, U.N. GAOR, 23rd Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/7218
(1968).
45. See Arend, supra note 8, at 788.
46. See Pitt, supra note 17 (explaining scope of UNCLOS III provisions).
47. UNCLOS III, supra note 16, arts. 2-4, 21 I.L.M. at 1272. The Territorial Sea is
the ocean area extending from the shore of a coastal nation to a maximum of 12 nauti-
cal miles under international law. Id. art. 3, 21 I.L.M. at 1272.
48. See generally SCHOENBAUM, supra note 8, at 31-42 (discussing UNCLOS III mari-
time zones).
49. UNCLOS III, supra note 16, arts. 2-4, 21 I.L.M. at 1272.
50. Id. art. 33, 21 I.L.M. at 1276. The coastal nation has limited powers in the
Contiguous Zone. Id. Article 33 of the Convention states:
In a zone contiguous to its territorial sea, described as the contiguous zone,
the coastal State may exercise the control necessary to . . . prevent infringe-
ment of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within
its territory or territorial sea; punish infringement of the above laws and regu-
lations committed within its territory or territorial sea.
Id.
51. Id. art. 55, 21 I.L.M. at 1280. Nations have some sovereignty in their Exclusive
Economic Zones. Id. The legal regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone, as defined in
UNCLOS III, consists of "an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to
the specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction
of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are governed by the
relevant provisions of this Convention. Id.
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and the Area.52 The Territorial Sea extends twelve nautical
miles5" from the baseline 54 of a coastal nation.5  A coastal nation
has sovereignty over this area including air space over the sea as
well as its bed and subsoil.56
While a coastal nation has complete control in the Territo-
rial Sea, there is a historical notion that a country needed to
protect itself through jurisdiction over an area that came to be
known as the Contiguous Zone. The Contiguous Zone is next
to and seaward of the Territorial Sea out to a maximum of 24
nautical miles from the baseline.5 8 A coastal nation may regulate
customs and impose fiscal regulations in this area.59 Thus, a
coastal nation has a certain level of sovereignty in the Contigu-
ous Zone.
The Exclusive Economic Zone, a concept originally
introduced in UNCLOS 111,60 is also adjacent to the Territorial
52. Id. art. 1, 1 1, 21 I.L.M. at 1272. The Area is defined as "the sea-bed and ocean
floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." Id.
53. See D.C. KAPOOR & ADAM J. KERR, A GUIDE TO MARITIME BOUNDARY DELIMITA-
TION 21 (1986). UNCLOS III uses the nautical mile as the unit of distance and length
measurement without defining this expression in linear terms. Id. The International
Hydrographic Conference of 1929 approved the value of 1852 meters for the "interna-
tional nautical mile," which has been adopted by most maritime nations and the Inter-
national Bureau of Weights and Measures. Id.
54. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 8, at 26-31 (explaining methods of determining
baselines). A baseline is the starting point from which all measurements of the outer
limits of maritime zones may be made. KAPOOR & KERR, supra note 53, at 29. The
baseline is both the starting point for the outer limits of maritime zones and the limit-
ing line for internal waters. Id.
55. UNCLOS III, supra note 16, art. 3, 21 I.L.M. at 1272. The extension of the
Territorial Sea from its traditional breadth of three miles has left uncertain whether the
states or the federal government will assume jurisdiction over the additional area. See
Carol Elizabeth Remy, Note, US. Territorial Sea Extension: Jurisdiction and International
Environmental Protection, 16 FoRDHAM INT'L LJ. 1208 (1992-93) (arguing that for pur-
poses of protecting environment through uniform laws, federal government, rather
than individual states, should acquire jurisdiction over Territorial Sea from three miles
out to twelve mile extension).
56. UNCLOS III, supra note 16, art. 2, 21 I.L.M. at 1272.
57. See Remy, supra note 55, at 1221 n.79 (explaining that coastal nation's interest
was particularly to prevent smuggling from its territory). Smuggling was an early con-
cern of eighteenth century countries with powerful navies. ARND BERNAERTS,
BERNAERTS' GUIDE TO THE LAW OF THE SEA 112 (1988). The modem need for the Con-
tiguous Zone is for national security reasons. Id.
58. UNCLOS III, supra note 16, art. 33, 21 I.L.M. at 1276.
59. Id. 1(a).
60. See Remy, supra note 55, at 1223 n.88. Both UNCLOS I and UNCLOS II did
not include an Exclusive Economic Zone. Id. For a discussion on how the Exclusive
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Sea.61 A coastal nation by proclamation may establish an Exclu-
sive Economic Zone that overlaps the Contiguous Zone and ex-
tends seaward to a maximum of 200 nautical miles.62 The
coastal nation has sovereign rights over activities affecting natu-
ral resources existing in the waters or seabed within the Exclu-
sive Economic Zone's boundaries. 63 A coastal nation also has
powers related to artificial installations, marine scientific re-
search, and protection of the marine environment in the Exclu-
sive Economic Zone.64
The Area, otherwise known as the deep seabed, constitutes
the subsoil of the ocean and the ocean floor beyond the reaches
of coastal nation jurisdiction.6" There are no sovereign rights in
the Area because property is considered to be "the common her-
itage of mankind."66 According to UNCLOS III, the Interna-
tional Seabed Authority6 7 (the "Authority") ensures that activi-
ties in the Area are carried out for the "benefit of mankind as a
whole."6a
Economic Zone developed out of coastal nation's desire to expand a fisheries zone, see
ODA, supra note 43, at xiii-xx.
61. UNCLOS III, supra note 16, art. 55, 21 I.L.M. at 1280.
62. Id. art. 57, 21 I.L.M. at 1280. Article 57 states, "[t]he exclusive economic zone
shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth
of the territorial sea is measured." Id. In 1983, President Reagan issued a proclamation
creating a 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone for the United States. Proclamation No.
5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (1983). Over 60 nations have proclaimed an Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone. KAPOOR & KERR, supra note 53, at 8.
63. UNCLOS III, supra note 16, art. 56, 21 I.L.M. at 1280. Article 56 states that
coastal nations have
sovereign rights for the purposes of exploring and exploiting, conserving and
managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters...
and of the sea-bed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the
economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of
energy from the water, currents and winds ....
Id.
64. Id. art. 56, 1(b), 21 I.L.M. at 1279. Article 56, 1(b) states, "In the exclusive
economic zone, the coastal State has ... jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant
provisions of this Convention with regard to... the establishment and use of artificial
islands, installations and structures ... ." Id.
65. Id. art. 1, 1, 21 I.L.M. at 1271.
66. Id., art. 136, 21 I.L.M. at 1293; see supra note 42 (discussing "common heritage"
implications).
67. UNCLOS III, supra note 16, art. 156, 21 I.L.M. at 1298. The Convention estab-
lishes the Authority through Article 156 which states, "It] here is hereby established the
International Seabed Authority, which shall function in accordance with [Part 4 of the
Convention]." Id.
68. UNCLOS III, supra note 16, art. 140, 1 1, 21 I.L.M. at 1293.
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In addition to creating these zones with various levels of na-
tional sovereignty, the Convention also includes a provision for
the Continental Shelf, a geologically defined area of the ocean
floor.6 9 The Continental Shelf is a natural prolongation of a
coastal nation's land. ° It may extend over 200 nautical miles
from the baseline. 71 The coastal nation has sovereign rights to
control exploration and exploitation of natural resources on the
Continental Shelf.72 According to Article 81 of the Convention,
a coastal nation has the power to regulate drilling on its Conti-
nental Shelf for "all purposes."7 3
B. UNCLOS 1Mf Marine Archaeology Provisions
The maritime zones included in the Convention establish
parameters for a coastal nation's ability to regulate marine ar-
69. Id. art. 76, 21 I.L.M. at 1285.
70. Id. Article 76 states that the Continental Shelf is "the sea-bed and subsoil of
the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolon-
gation of its land territory.... " Id. (emphasis added). See generally D.N. Hutchinson,
The Concept of Natural Prolongation in the Jurisprudence Concerning Delimitation of Continen-
tal Shelf Areas, 55 BrT. Y.B. INT'L L. 415 (1986) (discussing concept of natural prolonga-
tion of Continental Shelf). The full text of Article 76, 1 of UNCLOS III states:
The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the sea-bed and subsoil of
the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the nat-
ural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental
margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which
the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the
continental margin does not extend up to that distance.
UNCLOS III, supra note 16, art. 76, 1, 21 I.L.M. at 1285.
71. See UNCLOS III, supra note 16, art. 76, 1, 21 I.L.M. at 1285. The extension
of the Continental Shelf depends on the location of the continental margin. Id. The
continental margin is defined in Article 76, paragraph 3. Id., art. 76, 3. This provi-
sion states that "[t] he continental margin comprises the submerged prolongation of the
land mass of the coastal State, and consists of the sea-bed and subsoil of the shelf, the
slope and the rise. It does not include the deep ocean floor with its oceanic ridges or
the subsoil thereof." Id. If the continental margin is located beyond 200 nautical miles,
the Continental Shelf ends where at the continental margin. Id., art. 76, 1. If the
continental margin is located closer to the baseline than 200 nautical miles, the Conti-
nental Shelf ends at 200 nautical miles from the baseline. Id.
72. See id. art. 77, 21 I.L.M. at 1285. The Convention's provision of the rights of
the coastal nation is explicit. Id. Paragraph one of Article 77 states, "[t]he coastal State
exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and
exploiting its natural resources." Id.; see supra note 34 (discussing definition of natural
resources under Continental Shelf Convention).
73. Id. art. 81, 21 I.L.M. at 1286. Article 81 states, "[t]he coastal State shall have the
exclusive right to authorize and regulate drilling on the continental shelf for all pur-
poses." Id.
680 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol.17:667
chaeology in general.7 1 In addition, articles 14975 and 30376 of
UNCLOS III specifically deal with archaeological resources
found at sea. The four treaties comprising UNCLOS I did not
include archaeological provisions.77 Thus, the inclusion of these
provisions in UNCLOS III means that the Convention, if ratified,
will change the international law governing marine archaeology
left by UNCLOS 1.78
Article 149 states the broad proposition that nations should
preserve historic shipwrecks found in the Area for the "benefit of
mankind as a whole." 79 Article 303 is a "General Provision" of
UNCLOS Ill.80 This article provides that a nation has a duty to
protect historic shipwrecks and that a nation may presume that
removal of artifacts from its Contiguous Zone violates its customs
laws.81 Article 303 also provides that nothing in the provision
74. See Oxman, supra note 8, at 355 (stating that law of sea provides jurisdictional
framework for regulation of marine archaeology).
75. UNCLOS III, supra note 16, art. 149, 21 I.L.M. at 1295.
76. Id. art. 303, 21 I.L.M. at 1326.
77. See Arend, supra note 8, at 782.
78. Id. (stating that UNCLOS III will effect international marine archaeology law
left unaddressed by UNCLOS I).
79. UNCLOS III, supra note 16, art. 149, 21 I.L.M. at 1295. Article 149 provides:
All objects of an archeological and historical nature found in the Area shall be
preserved or disposed of for the benefit of mankind as a whole, particular
regard being paid to the preferential rights of the State or country of origin,
or the State of cultural origin, or the State of historical and archeological ori-
gin.
Id.
80. UNCLOS III, supra note 16, art. 303, 21 I.L.M. at 1326. Article 303 provides:
1. States have the duty to protect objects of an archeological and histori-
cal nature found at sea and shall co-operate for this purpose.
2. In order to control traffic in such objects, the coastal State may, in
applying article 33, presume that their removal from the sea-bed in the zone
referred to in that article without its approval would result in an infringement
within its territory or territorial sea of the laws and regulations referred to in
that article.
3. Nothing in this article affects the rights of identifiable owners, the law
of salvage or other rules of admiralty, or laws and practices with respect to
cultural exchanges.
4. This article is without prejudice to other international agreements and
rules of international law regarding the protection of objects of an archeologi-
cal and historical nature.
Id.
81. Id. 2. Paragraph two of Article 303 of the Convention essentially allows a
coastal nation to presume that the removal of shipwrecks constitutes smuggling. See
Oxman, supra note 8, at 264 (stating that Article 303, paragraph 2 does nothing to
expand coastal nation's jurisdiction in Contiguous Zone except to provide presumption
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will affect established ownership principles under admiralty law 2
and is "without prejudice" to other international agreements
and laws that deal with archaeological artifacts.8 3
C. UNCLOS III Dispute Settlement Provisions
The dispute settlement provisions of UNCLOS III were in-
cluded in the Convention to ensure that one nation's unilateral
interpretation of UNCLOS III would not prevail over another
nation's understanding of the Convention's text."4 According to
UNCLOS III, parties to a dispute may agree to settle a dispute by
any method they wish.85 The Convention provides different pro-
cedures for different categories of disputes.86 While articles 279
through 299, included in Part XV of UNCLOS III, address dis-
pute settlements generally, articles 186 through 191 deal with
disputes over seabed mining in the Area. 7
D. U.S. Abandoned Shipwreck Law
Current U.S. abandoned shipwreck law is represented by
the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987 (the "ASA").88 The ASA
was designed to resolve the legal problems with state regulation
of historically significant shipwrecks on submerged lands within
the territorial limits. 89 Senator Bill Bradley [D-NJ], who origi-
of smuggling); supra note 50 (setting forth text of Article 33. which provides a coastal
nation with jurisdiction to apply its own customs laws in its Territorial Sea).
82. Id. 3.
83. Id. 4. In effect, "without prejudice" means that the drafters wanted to pro-
tect other international agreements and laws concerning historic and archaeological
artifacts. See Newton, supra note 10, at 190.
84. See Sohn, supra note 29, at 195.
85. Id. at 196; see UNCLOS III, supra note 16, art. 280, 21 I.L.M. at 1322. Article
280 is included in Part XV of the Convention which provides general provisions relating
to the settlement of disputes. See id. Article 280 states, "[n]othing in this Part impairs
the right of any States Parties to agree at any time to settle a dispute between them
concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention by any peaceful means
of their own choice." Id.
86. See Sohn, supra note 29, at 197.
87. Id.
88. 43 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2106 (1988).
89. H.R. REP. No. 514, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 1 (1988) reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 365 [hereinafter House Report]. Shipwrecks of historic significance are
the target of the legislation. Id. Of the 50,000 abandoned shipwrecks located in the
navigable waters of the United States, approximately five to ten percent are estimated to
be of historic significance. Id.; see also Henry M. Arruda, Comment, The Extension of the
United States Territorial Sea: Reasons and Effects, 4 CONN. J. INT'L L. 697, 724-25 (1989)
(discussing how extension of Territorial Sea may affect state statutes).
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nally proposed the bill in the Senate, expressed particular con-
cern about the admiralty court's jurisdiction over historic ship-
wrecks.9 ° Congress enacted the ASA on April 28, 1988.91
Prior to the ASA's enactment, U.S. abandoned shipwreck
law was unsettled.9 2 Congress intended to provide clear rules re-
garding historic abandoned shipwrecks and to remedy the con-
fusion created by the courts.9 3 The abandoned shipwreck case
law, known as the "treasure salvage" cases,9 4 applied maritime
law of salvage and the law of finds to determine ownership of
resources lost at sea.95 The ASA attempts to protect historic
abandoned shipwrecks by removing abandoned historic ship-
wrecks from salvage and finds and by allowing state regulation of
90. 113 CONG. RFc. S3989 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1987) (statement of Sen. Bradley).
Senator Bradley said, "[u]nder the current system, Federal courts - sitting in admiralty
- have substantial policymaking power, which has resulted in uneven judgments about
the historical value of shipwrecks." Id.
91. See ASA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2106 (1988).
92. See House Report, supra note 89, at 366. The House Report states that, "[tihere
is currently confusion over the ownership and authority to manage abandoned ship-
wrecks. States have claimed title to, and regulatory authority over, abandoned historic
shipwrecks located on submerged lands under their jurisdiction. The Federal Admi-
ralty Courts have also claimed jurisdiction over the salvage of these resources." Id.
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., SCHOENAUM, supra note 8, at 513 (referring to cases deciding claims
to abandoned shipwrecks as "treasure salvage" cases).
95. Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670 (1982), on remand
689 F.2d 1254 (5th Cir. 1982); Klein v. The Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sail-
ing Vessel, 758 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1985); Maritime Underwater Surveys, Inc. v. The
Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 717 F.2d 6 (lst Cir. 1983); Trea-
sure Salvors, Inc. v. The Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 640 F.2d
560 (5th Cir. 1981); Platoro Ltd. v. The Unidentified Remains Of A Vessel, 614 F.2d
1051 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 901 (1980); Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. The Unidenti-
fied Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978);Jupiter Wreck,
Inc. v. The Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 691 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D.
Fla. 1988); Maritime Sys. Int'l, Inc. v. The Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel,
CIV.A.85-61 1CMW to 85-646CMW and 85-646CMW to 85-648CMW, 1986 WL 7512 (D.
Del. June 10, 1986); Indian River Recovery Co. v. The China, 645 F. Supp. 141 (D. Del.
1986); Chance v. Certain Artifacts Found & Salvaged From The Nashville, 606 F. Supp.
801 (S.D. Ga. 1984), aftfd, 775 F.2d 302 (11th Cir. 1985); Subaqueous Exploration &
Archaeology, Ltd. v. The Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 577 F. Supp. 597
(D. Md. 1983); Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. The Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Sail-
ing Vessel, 556 F. Supp. 1319 (S.D. Fla. 1983); Cobb Coin Co. v. The Unidentified,
Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 549 F. Supp. 540 (S.D. Fla. 1982); Metropolitan
Dade County v. One Bronze Cannon, 537 F. Supp. 923 (S.D. Fla. 1982); Hener v.
United States, 525 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Cobb Coin Co. v. The Unidentified,
Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 525 F. Supp. 186 (S.D. Fla. 1981); Weber Marine,
Inc. v. One Large Cast Steel Stockless Anchor, 478 F. Supp. 973 (E.D. La. 1979).
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historic resources.96 The ASA also, delineates ownership rules,
standards for determining which shipwrecks are worthy of pres-
ervation, and incentives to locate shipwrecks.97
1. The Law of Finds
Prior to the ASA, U.S. courts decided who owned aban-
doned shipwrecks by applying the common law notion of finds
law.98 The law of finds embodies the idea that a finder of dere-
lict property is entitled to ownership of that property.99 While
U.S. courts adopted the law of finds to determine title to lost
property, at one time the courts considered applying the doc-
trine of sovereign prerogative to do so. ° °
Sovereign prerogative is an English common law rule stat-
ing that where property is found derelict at sea, the sovereign
acquires it rather than the finder.101 In Treasure Salvors v. The
Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected the federal government's
argument that they had expressly asserted title to a shipwreck
under sovereign prerogative. 10 2 In Treasure Salvors, the plaintiff,
a professional salvage company called Treasure Salvors, Inc.,
found a vessel in international waters off the coast of the Florida
Keys.' The plaintiffs asserted title to the vessel pursuant to the
96. ASA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 2106(a) & 2101 (1988).
97. See generally Guidelines, supra note 7 (including detailed recommendations for
these substantive issues).
98. See, e.g., Klein, 758 F.2d 1511; Chance, 606 F. Supp. 801; Indian River Recovery
Co., 645 F. Supp. 141.
99. Martha's Vineyard Scuba Headquarters, 833 F.2d at 1065. The doctrine of finds
expresses "the ancient and honorable principle of 'finders, keepers'." Id.
100. See Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. The Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing
Vessel, 569 F.2d 330, 342 (5th Cir. 1978).
101. SeeJohnJ. Kenny & Ronald R. Hrusoff, The Ownership of the Treasures of the Sea,
9 WM. & MARv L. REv. 383, 383-85 (1967). The rule of sovereign prerogative is still in
force in England and has been adopted in Canada. Canada Shipping Act, R.S.C., ch. 5-
9, § 422 (1985) (Can.); see Runyan, supra note 5, at 40-41 (discussing Canadian ap-
proach to regulating historic wreck sites).
102. Treasure Salvors, 569 F.2d at 342.
103. Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. The Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing
Vessel, 408 F. Supp. 907, 908 (S.D. Fla. 1976). Under the mistaken assumption that the
ship was in waters controlled by the state of Florida, the state required the salvor to
enter into a series of contracts with the state pursuant to the Florida Archives and His-
tory Act. Id. The Florida Archives and History Act provided that Florida claimed own-
ership of all historic shipwrecks found in state waters. Id. A salvor who wished to search
for historic shipwrecks must have obtained a license from the Florida Department of
State, Division of Archives. Id. Subsequently, upon discovery of a wreck, the salvor
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law of finds. °4 The U.S. government intervened and claimed
title to the ship based on sovereign prerogative. 105
The government's claim led the Fifth Circuit to decide
whether sovereign prerogative or the law of finds would prevail
in a U.S. admiralty court.10 6 In support of the plaintiffs, the
court held that the U.S. government had not expressly asserted
title to the wreck through sovereign prerogative. 0 7 As a result of
Treasure Salvors, U.S. courts have adopted the law of finds for the
must have contracted with the state for recovery of any artifacts. Id. Such a contract
gave salvors exclusive salvage rights over the wreck. Id. Based on the contract, the first
salvors would be the only parties able to contract with the state. Id. After the salvors
entered into these contracts with Florida, the Supreme Court in an unrelated case held
that the area in which the wreck was found was federal waters, not state territorial wa-
ters. United States v. Florida, 420 U.S. 531 (1975). As a result of this decision, Treasure
Salvors repudiated their contract with Florida and brought an in rem action in federal
court to claim tite to the ship. Shallcross & Giesecke, supra note 1, at 374.
104. Treasure Salvors, 408 F. Supp. at 907. The court stated that such a claim was
properly within the scope of a salvage action. Id. at 909.
105. Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. The Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing
Vessel, 569 F.2d. 330, 340-41 (5th Cir. 1978). The United States contended that sover-
eign prerogative had been asserted legislatively because it was incorporated in Ameri-
can law and Congress specifically asserted jurisdiction. Id. at 337. The government
argued that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1988 &
Supp. I1 1991) ("OCSLA") extended jurisdiction of the United States beyond the
three-mile limit. Id. at 338. OCSLA extends jurisdiction and control to the United
States to the Outer Continental Shelf. Id.
The government claimed that two federal statutes, the Abandoned Property Act
(40 U.S.C. § 310 (1988)) and the Antiquities Act (16 U.S.C. §§ 431-458(a) (1988)) gave
the federal government control of property located there. Id. at 337. The Abandoned
Property Act authorizes the administrator of General Services to protect the interest of
the government in wrecked, abandoned, or derelict property lying within the jurisdic-
tion of the United States and which ought to come to the United States. 40 U.S.C.
§ 310 (1988). The Antiquities Act authorizes executive designation of historic
landmarks situated upon lands owned or controlled by the United States as national
monuments. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-458(a) (1988).
The district court rejected this argument. Treasure Salvors, 408 F. Supp. at 909.
First, the court found that the Abandoned Property Act applied only to property aban-
doned as a consequence of the Civil War. Id. Second, according to the court, OCSLA
only gives the United States jurisdiction over mineral resources and does not apply to
shipwrecks and artifacts. Id. at 910. Therefore, the Antiquities Act did not apply. Id.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's holding. Treasure Salvors, 569
F.2d at 342.
106. See Treasure Salvors, 569 F.2d 330 (deciding whether sovereign prerogative or
law of finds would be applied by United States courts to abandoned shipwrecks).
107. Id. at 343. The court stated, "[t]he 'American rule' vesting title in the finder
has been widely recognized by courts and writers." Id. But see William J. Pallas, Note,
The Doctrine of State Succession and the Law of Historic Shipwrecks, The Bell of the Alabama:
United States v. Steinmetz, 17 TUL. MAR. L.J. 343 (1993) (discussing failure of U.S.
courts to apply law of finds to Civil War property).
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historic shipwrecks found at sea.108
Under the doctrine of finds, a finder gains title to property
if the property has never been owned by anyone 0 9 or if it has
been abandoned. 1 The finder must also demonstrate intent to
obtain the property and that the finder exercised possession or
at least a high degree of control over the property.1 ' Abandon-
ment must be more than merely leaving the property.'1 2
Neither the lapse of time11 nor the inability to locate an
owner n 4 necessarily divests an owner of title to property.
Rather, a finder must meet a high degree of proof that the
owner intended to abandon the property.1 '5 Often times, this
entails an owner's affirmative act indicating a repudiation of
ownership." 6 If the owner fails to appear in court to claim the
property, however, a court may infer that the owner intended to
abandon the property.'1 7 Because of the likelihood that a his-
108. See supra note 95 (listing treasure salvage cases).
109. See, e.g., Columbus-America Discovery Group, Inc. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co.,
974 F.2d 450, 459-60 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating that historically, courts applied finds law
only to maritime property such as ambergris, whales, and fish that never belonged to
anyone (citing 3A BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 158 (Martin J. Norris et al. eds., 7th ed.
1993)), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 1625 (1993).
110. See id. at 460 (explaining that law of finds applies to abandoned property).
111. Id. (quoting Hener v. United States, 525 F. Supp. 350, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
The court stated that in order to show intent,
[a] would-be finder should be expected to act acquisitively, to express a will to
own by acts designed to establish the high degree of control required for a
finding of possession. The would-be finder's longing to acquire is exacerbated
by the prospect of being found to have failed to establish title. If either intent
or possession is found lacking, the would-be finder receives nothing; neither
effort alone nor acquisition unaccompanied by the required intent is re-
warded ... Furthermore, success as a finder is measured solely in terms of
obtaining possession of specific property; possession of specific property can
seldom be shared, and mere contribution by one party to another's successful
efforts to obtain possession earns no compensation.
Id.
112. Id. at 461. The court stated, "[tioday, finds law is applied to previously owned
sunken property only when that property has been abandoned by its previous owners.
Abandonment in this sense means much more than merely leaving the property .... 
Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. The proof must be "strong... such as the owner's express declaration
abandoning title." SCHOENBAUM, supra note 8, at 512.
116. The Port Hunter, 6 F. Supp. 1009, 1011 (D. Mass. 1934).
117. See Columbus-America Discovery Group, Inc. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 974
F.2d 450, 462 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating that there is only one case that has applied law of
1994]
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toric shipwreck would be abandoned,' 1 8 U.S. courts logically ap-
plied this common law notion to decide ownership claims to his-
toric shipwrecks before the ASA's passage.119
2. Salvage Law
U.S. courts also applied the traditional admiralty law of sal-
vage to historic shipwrecks before the ASA's passage rather than
the law of finds, when an owner had not abandoned the prop-
erty. 120 Unlike the law of finds, salvage law does not grant title of
a shipwreck to a salvor.12 1 Rather, salvage law guarantees a right
to a reward from the owners of the vessel to compensate salvors
for their service in saving foundering ships at sea. 122
In order to protect the initial salvor's interest in recovering
the property, customary admiralty law recognizes the right of
first salvor.1 23 An admiralty court will enjoin other salvors from
interfering with the first salvor's recovery operations.1 24 Pursu-
finds where previous owner showed up in court), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 1625
(1993).
118. See, e.g., Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. The Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned
Sailing Vessel, 569 F.2d 330, 337 (5th Cir. 1978) (stating that, "[d]isposition of a
wrecked vessel whose very location has been lost for centuries as though its owner were
still in existence stretches a fiction to absurd lengths."); see also Arend, supra note 8, at
779 n.8 (stating that there may be no person, legal or natural, who might be able to
claim title to shipwrecks that are too old to have a surviving owner).
119. See supra note 95 (listing treasure salvage cases).
120. See Columbus-America Discovery Group, 974 F.2d at 459. The Fourth Circuit
stated that, "[h]istorically, courts have applied the maritime law of salvage when ships or
their cargo have been recovered from the bottom of the sea by those other than their
owners. Under this law, the original owners still retain their ownership interests in such
property, although the salvors are entitled to a very liberal salvage award." Id.
A convention provides rules for international salvage law. See William L. Neilson,
The 1989 International Convention of Salvage, 24 CONN. L. REv. 1203, 1203 (1992). On
March 27, 1992, the United States ratified the 1989 salvage convention. See id. This
convention, if it comes into force, will replace the 1910 Brussels Convention on Salvage.
Id.; see also Nicholas J.J. Gaskell, The 1989 Salvage Convention and the Lloyd's Open Form
(LOF) Salvage Agreement 1990, 16 TUL. MAR. LJ. 1 (1991).
121. Columbus-America Discovery Group, 974 F.2d at 460-61.
122. Id.
123. See John P. Fry, Note, The Treasure Below: Jurisdiction Over Salving Operations in
International Waters, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 863, 876 (1988) (stating that admiralty courts
historically have protected right of first salvor); 3A BENEDICT, supra note 109, § 227.
124. 3A BENEDICT, supra note 109, at § 227 (stating that admiralty courts will pro-
tect rights of first salvors legally in possession).
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ant to such an injunction, a first salvor continues with an in
rem125 action to receive the reward.' 26
A salvage claim results in the salvor securing a maritime lien
on the salved property, allowing the salvor, as plaintiff, to bring
an in rem action against the ship and collect the reward.12 7 In
order for the salvor to bring the in rem action against the ship
and receive the monetary award, the salvor must show a "marine
peril,"'2 8 service voluntarily rendered when not required as an
existing duty or from a special contract,1 9 and success in whole
or in part.130
These three elements, which are required to establish a sal-
vage cause of action, are distinct from the factors courts consider
125. See NicHOLASJ. HEALY & DAvDJ. SHARPE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADMIRALTY
118 (2d ed. 1986). An action in rem connotes that a ship can be named as sole defend-
ant in a complaint. Id. In essence, the vessel is personified. Id. Thus, the ship is ar-
rested by a U.S. marshal, defaulted, tried, found at fault, and sold at auction to cover
damages all without the active participation of the shipowner in personam. Id.
126. See Giu Ona & BLACK, THE LAw OF ADMiRALTY § 8-13 (2d ed. 1975). An in rem
action in admiralty generally requires the presence of the vessel within the court's terri-
tory. Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. The Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel,
569 F.2d 330, 333 (5th Cir. 1978). This requirement is based on admiralty law's fiction
of convenience that personifies a ship and allows a plaintiff salvor to recover from the
ship itself when the court may not assert jurisdiction over the owner. Id. at 333-34.
However, some courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have conferred in rem juris-
diction when the res is not located within the court's territory. Continental Grain Co. v.
Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19 (1960). In Treasure Salvors, the court held that the United
States, by intervening in an in rem action, waived the usual requirement that the res be
before the court. Treasure Salvors, 569 F.2d at 335. Because the United States con-
sented to the court's jurisdiction, the United States could not claim that the court could
not determine property interests in the subject of the litigation. Id. The court also
stated that it had in personam jurisdiction over the parties. Id. As a result, arrest of the
vessel was not essential to resolving the dispute. Id.
By not requiring the presence of the vessel within the court's territory, U.S. courts
may obtain jurisdiction over shipwrecks located in international waters. See Moyer v,
The Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, Known As The Andrea Doria, 836 F. Supp. 1099
(D.NJ. 1993). Even though vessels may lay outside the Territorial Sea, nevertheless
"[c]laims arising out of salvage operations at sea beyond the territorial limits of the
United States are within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts." MDM Salvage,
Inc. v. The Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 631 F. Supp. 308, 311
(S.D. Fla. 1986).
127. 3A BENEDiCT, supra note 109, § 288.
128. Id. § 63. A "peril" is considered to be a situation that requires some action to
remove a vessel or its cargo from danger of being damaged. See id.; see also, Flagship
Marine Services, Inc. v. Belcher Towing Co., 761 F. Supp. 792 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
129. 3A BENEDICT, supra note 109, § 68; B.V. Bureau Wijsmuller v. United States,
702 F.2d 333, 338 (2d Cir. 1983).
130. The Blackwall, 77 U.S. 1, 12 (1870).
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when fashioning a salvage award. 13' The factors courts assess in
determining the size of a salvage reward include the labor ex-
pended by the salvors in rendering the salvage service 132 and the
promptitude, skill, and energy displayed in rendering the service
in saving the property. 33 Courts may consider other issues as
well, such as the value of the property employed by the salvors in
rendering the service13 4 and the danger to which such property
was exposed. 135 Finally, courts appraise the risk incurred by the
salvors in securing the property from the impending peril, the
value of the property saved, and the degree of danger from
which the property was rescued.' 3 6
In recognition of the potential historic value of abandoned
shipwrecks, some courts have limited a salvage reward if salvage
operations did not take into consideration the historic and
archaeological value of the wreck.' 37 For example, in Chance v.
Certain Artifacts Found & Salvaged From The Nashville,13 the court
held that a salvage award should be denied because a salvor had
placed the shipwreck in a greater danger than if the wreck were
safely lying on the ocean bottom. 39 In Klein v. Unidentified,
Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing' Vessel, 140 the court went one step
further by mandating that a plaintiff mark and identify artifacts
removed from the shipwreck site to meet archaeological stan-
dards in salvaging. 4'
131. Compare 3A BENEDTar, supra note 109, § 63 with § 237.
132. 3A BENEDICT, supra note 109, § 237.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See Chance v. Certain Artifacts Found & Salvaged From The Nashville, 606 F.
Supp. 801 (S.D. Ga. 1984), affd, 775 F2d 302 (11th Cir. 1985); Klein v. The Unidenti-
fied Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 758 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1985).
138. 606 F. Supp. 801 (S.D. Ga. 1984).
139. Chance, 606 F. Supp. at 809. The court noted that the plaintiff claiming a
salvage award had not taken proper precautions to preserve the artifacts pulled from
the shipwreck. Id. The plaintiff had stored artifacts in holding bins but did not change
the water in the bins. Id. Additionally, the plaintiff piled the artifacts in plaintiffs
backyard, which exposed the artifacts to harmful exposure to the elements. Id.
140. 758 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1985).
141. Klein v. The Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 758 F.2d
1511, 1515 (11th Cir. 1985). The court quoted the district court stating, "the plaintiff's
unauthorized disturbance of one of the oldest shipwrecks in the [Biscayne National]
Park and his unscientific removal of the artifacts did more to create a marine peril than
to prevent one." Id. (quoting Klein v. The Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel,
568 F. Supp. 1562, 1568 (S.D. Fla. 1984)).
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Only maritime property may be the subject of salvage.14 2
Courts, however, construe the term "maritime property" broadly
so that maritime property may encompass a variety of items.1 4
Pursuant to this flexible definition, courts have considered both
money on a floating corpse 144 and floating logs'45 to be maritime
property subject to a salvage claim. In the United States, courts
have not questioned whether historic shipwrecks are maritime
property. 4 6 Rather, U.S. courts have questioned whether his-
toric shipwrecks are a part of maritime commerce for purposes
of admiralty jurisdiction. 147
3. The Use of Salvage and Finds for Claims in Treasure
Salvage Cases
U.S. courts have considered both the doctrines of finds and
salvage law in claims to abandoned shipwrecks. 14  In addition to
deciding that the law of finds should apply rather than sovereign
prerogative, in Treasure Salvors the Fifth Circuit also referred to
the law of finds as an "adjunct" to the law of marine salvage, 149
holding that the two legal principles were consistent because a
salvage award could amount to the entire vessel.' 50 Thus, the
142. Cope v. Vallette Dry-Dock Co., 119 U.S. 625 (1887) (dry-dock moored in same
position for twenty years is not maritime property).
143. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 8, at 505.
144. Broere v. Two Thousand One Hundred Thirty-Three Dollars, 72 F. Supp. 115
(E.D.N.Y. 1947).
145. Tidewater Salvage, Inc. v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 633 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1980).
146. See, e.g., supra note 95 (listing treasure salvage cases).
147. See Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670 (1982)
(Supreme Court implicitly accepted admiralty jurisdiction over abandoned historic
shipwrecks); Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, Believed To Be The
"Seabird," 941 F.2d 525, 532 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that federal courts did not ques-
tion admiralty jurisdiction over shipwrecks before passage of Abandoned Shipwreck Act
of 1987), modifying 746 F. Supp. 1334 (N.D. Ill. 1990), on remand, 811 F. Supp. 1300
(N.D. Ill. 1992), aff'd, No. 93-1426, 1993 WL 88377 (7th Cir. (Ill.) Mar. 21, 1994). The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Zych also expressed the opposing view
that abandoned shipwrecks are not firmly within admiralty jurisdiction because they are
not related to maritime commerce. Id. at 531.
148. See, e.g., Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. The Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned
Sailing Vessel, 569 F.2d 330, 336-37 (5th Cir. 1978) (discussing application of salvage
law or law of finds to abandoned shipwrecks).
149. Id. at 336. The Fifth Circuit stated, "[w]hether salvage law or the adjunct law
of finds should be applied to property abandoned at sea is a matter of some dispute."
Id. (citation omitted).
150. Id. at 337. The Fifth Circuit noted that under salvage law, "awards may in-
clude the entire derelict property." Id. (citation omitted).
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remedies available for a finds or a salvage claim could be the
same.
15 1
Procedurally, pursuant to the combined principle of the
laws of salvage and finds, a salvor may bring an in ren action
when seeking either a salvage reward or title under the law of
finds. 15 2 The combination of the two legal principles is also sig-
nificant because it provides federal courts with exclusive subject
matter jurisdiction 5 ' over such cases.'- 4 Federal courts have ex-
clusive jurisdiction over salvage because no common law remedy
permits concurrent jurisdiction in state courts. 55
Federal courts would not, however, have exclusive jurisdic-
tion over a simple claim to title under the law of finds because it
is a common law cause of action. 156 As a result of merging the
two principles, federal courts have exclusive subject matter juris-
diction over both salvage actions and claims to title under the
law of finds.'- 7 Due to the alternative pleading in a treasure sal-
151. See id. (explaining that under both salvage and finds law, court may award
whole shipwreck to plaintiff).
152. See, e.g., Zych v. The Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, Believed
To Be The SB "Lady Elgin," 746 F. Supp. 1334, 1336 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (plaintiff salvor
claimed ownership of wreck or, alternatively, salvage award), modified, 941 F.2d 525 (7th
Cir. 1991), on remand, 811 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ill. 1992), aff'd, No. 93-1426, 1993 WL
88377 (7th Cir. (Ill.), Mar. 21, 1994).
153. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988) (stating that federal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime cases). In addition to admiralty
jurisdiction, a U.S. federal court may obtain jurisdiction over cases or controversies in
two other ways. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1332 (1988). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, a federal
court has jurisdiction over all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or trea-
ties of the United States. Id. § 1331. Also, a federal court in the United States has
jurisdiction over actions involving parties of diverse citizenship. See id. § 1332.
154. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 8, at 513 (explaining that admiralty subject matter
jurisdiction is present whether the claim involves salvage or finds).
155. 28 U.S.C. § 1333. 28 U.S.C. § 1333, the "savings to suitors clause," provides in
pertinent part that, "[t] he district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the
courts of the States, of... [a] ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to
suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1333 (1988).
156. See Columbus-America Discovery Group, Inc. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 974
F.2d 450, 461 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, - U.S. -_, 113 S. Ct. 1625 (1993).
157. Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. The Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing
Vessel, 569 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978). In Treasure Salvors, the plaintiffs proceeded solely
on the basis of a finds claim, not a salvage claim. Id. Nevertheless, the court treated the
case as admiraltyjurisdiction. Id.; see Zych v. The Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned
Vessel, Believed To Be The SB "Lady Elgin," 746 F. Supp. 1334, 1338-39 (N.D. Ill. 1990)
(stating that plaintiff's primary goal was recovery of property, but that salvage reward
was requested in alternative), modified, 941 F.2d 525 (7th Cir. 1991), on remand, 811 F.
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vage case, an admiralty court must decide which claim is more
appropriate.'5 8 Some courts have refused to apply the law of
finds. 159
For example, in Columbus-America Discovery Group, Inc. v. At-
lantic Mutual Insurance Co.,16° the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of whether -to apply the law of
salvage or finds to an abandoned shipwreck. 6 In Columbus-
America Discovery Group, the plaintiffs discovered an 1857 ship-
wreck, the S.S. Central America, 160 miles off the coast of South
Carolina in international waters.' 62 The plaintiffs claimed that
they were either finder or salvor and were therefore entitled to
title to the vessel and its cargo or a salvage reward. 163
In deciding whether the law of finds or salvage should apply
to the shipwreck, the Fourth Circuit considered whether insur-
ance companies who had paid claims on the shipwreck had re-
tained ownership interests.'64 The Fourth Circuit held that
there was enough evidence to support the finding that the insur-
ance underwriters had not abandoned the property and there-
fore determined that the law of finds did not apply.'6 5 The court
applied salvage law to the case and remanded the action to the
district court to determine the salvage reward.' 66
While the Fourth Circuit was concerned with whether the
shipwreck had been abandoned by the underwriters, the court
was also interested in the effect finds law or salvage law might
Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ill. 1992), afTd, No. 93-1426, 1993 WL 88377 (7th Cir. (Ill.) Mar. 21,
1994).
158. See, e.g., Columbus-America Discovey Group, 974 F.2d 450, 459-64 (discussing
whether courts should apply salvage or finds law to abandoned shipwrecks).
159. See id. at 467 (holding that district court erred in applying law of finds and
requiring district court to apply salvage law on remand).
160. 974 F.2d 450.
161. Id. at 462; see also Craig N. McLean, Comment, Law of Salvage Reclaimed: Co-
lumbus-America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mutual, 13 BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 477 (1993)
(discussing Fourth Circuit's decision); Todd B. Siegler, Note, "Finders, Keepers" Revised
for the High Seas: Columbus-America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance, 17
TUL. MAR. L.J. 353 (1993) (discussing Fourth Circuit's decision).
162. 974 F.2d at 455; see also King, supra note 10, at 316-19 (explaining how U.S.
court had jurisdiction over vessel located outside court's territory).
163. Columbus-America Discovery Group, Inc. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d
450, 458 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 1625 (1993).
164. Id. at 450. British and American insurers paid over U.S.$1 million in claims
upon the disaster. Id.
165. Id. at 461.
166. Id. at 470.
19941
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have on salvors' conduct. 167 The court noted, for example, that
would-be finders would be encouraged to act secretively to avoid
claims of previous owners or interference by other potential
finders.' 68 In contrast, the law of salvage would encourage less
competitive and secretive conduct. 169 Because of the availability
of the injunction to protect the right of first salvor, the first sal-
vor would not fear the interference by other salvors and would
engage in its salvage activity openly.
170
In addition to applying the Columbus-America Discovery Group
considerations, a court may also limit the use of the law of finds
if the facts of the case fall within an exception to the general
doctrine. 171 A common law exception to the law of finds exists if
the property is found "embedded" in the soil.' 71 In this situa-
tion, states have brought claims to shipwrecks under the Sub-
merged Lands Act ("SLA"), which give states ownership of the
Territorial Sea.173 Accordingly, a shipwreck embedded in the
bottom of the territorial sea is owned by the state in who's terri-
tory it is located. 174
While some courts have limited the application of the law of
finds, other courts have limited the application of salvage law to
shipwrecks even when they are not completely abandoned, rea-
soning that abandoned shipwrecks are not in a marine peril, a
necessary element of salvage.' 75 In one case, expert testimony
167. Id. at 460.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (explaining right of first salvor
under salvage law).
171. See Klein v. The Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 758 F.2d
1511 (11th Cir. 1985); Chance v. Certain Artifacts Found & Salvaged From The Nash-
ville, 606 F. Supp. 801, 807 (S.D. Ga. 1984), affd, 775 F.2d 302 (11th Cir. 1985) (law of
finds did not apply because "vessel [was] firmly attached to the river bottom" and there-
fore belonged to state). In Klein, the court dismissed the plaintiff's claims for tide
under the law of finds and a salvage award. Klein, 758 F.2d 1511. The court held that
the ship was located on lands controlled by the United States and thus the sovereign
had constructive possession of it. Id. at 1514. As to the salvage request, the court de-
cided that the United States had the right to refuse salvage efforts. Id. at 1515.
172. Id. at 1514.
173. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1988); see Zych v. The Unidentified, Wrecked &
Abandoned Vessel Believed To Be The SB "Lady Elgin," 746 F. Supp. 1334, 1343 (N.D.
I11. 1990), modifed, 941 F.2d 525 (7th Cir. 1991), on remand, 811 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ill.
1992), aftd, No. 93-1426, 1993 WL 88377 (7th Cir. (Ill.) Mar. 21, 1994).
174. See Zych, 746 F. Supp. at 1343.
175. See Klein, 758 F.2d 1511 (abandoned shipwrecks are not in marine peril); Sub-
aqueous Exploration & Archaeology, Ltd. v. The Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned
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established that an abandoned shipwreck reached a stage of
"equilibrium" once it was no longer in any danger of destruc-
tion. 176 Thus, salvage operations increased the peril of the
wreck due to the disturbance caused by such activities.' Other
courts have found nevertheless that shipwrecks are constantly in
a marine peril due to the exposure to the elements and the po-
tential for further damage.17
8
4. The Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987
By passing the Abandoned Shipwreck Act ("ASA"), the U.S.
Congress significantly altered the existing law established by the
treasure salvage cases. 179 The statute removed historic shipwreck
law from admiralty principles, under which U.S. courts previ-
ously dealt with treasure salvage, by excluding historic ship-
wrecks found in the territorial waters of the United States from
the law of salvage and finds.1 80 The ASA also provides standards
for determining historic significance 18' and incentives for
Vessel, 577 F. Supp. 597 (D.Md. 1983) (abandoned shipwrecks are not in marine peril);
Chance v. Certain Artifacts Found & Salvaged From The Nashville, 606 F. Supp. 801
(S.D. Ga. 1984) (abandoned shipwrecks are not in marine peril); see supra note 128
(defining marine peril).
In spite of these views, there are some courts that have held that abandoned ship-
wrecks are in a marine peril and therefore subject to a salvage claim. See Platoro Ltd. v.
The Unidentified Remains Of A Vessel, 695 F.2d 893 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
901 (1980) (stating that abandoned shipwrecks are in marine peril); Treasure Salvors,
Inc. v. The Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569 F.2d 330 (5th Cir.
1978) (finding that abandoned shipwrecks are in a marine peril);Jupiter Wreck, Inc. v.
The Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 691 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D. Fla.
1988) (explaining that abandoned shipwrecks are in marine peril).
176. See Chance, 606 F. Supp. at 808. The court quoted an expert witness who
appeared at trial. Id. Dr. Wright, the expert, stated that, "[there is an initial state of
rapid deterioration. It [the vessel] adjusts to the environment in which it is, and then it
reaches a state of equilibrium. The deterioration continues at a much, much slower
rate. It will remain in a state of equilibrium, until it is once again disturbed." Id. (cita-
tion omitted).
177. Id. at 808-09.
178. Treasure Salvors, 569 F.2d at 337 (explaining that vessel remains in marine
peril after discovery due to exposure to elements).
179. See supra note 95 (listing treasure salvage cases involving law of salvage and
finds); 43 U.S.C. § 2106(a) (1988) (stating that Abandoned Shipwreck Act excludes
historic shipwrecks from law of salvage and finds).
180. Id.
181. See Guidelines, supra note 7, at 50,121 (providing definition of historic ship-
wreck according to ASA).
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searching for historic shipwrecks.182 Despite a challenge to its
constitutionality, a federal court has upheld the ASA as con-
forming to the U.S. Constitution." 3
182. Id. at 50,132-35 (recommending ways to provide for public and private sector
recovery of shipwrecks).
183. Zych v. The Unidentified, Wrecked, & Abandoned Vessel, Believed To Be
The SB "Seabird," No. 93-1426, 1993 WL 88377 (7th Cir. (Ill.) Mar. 21, 1994), affg 811
F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ill. 1992). Zych represents a current constitutional challenge to the
ASA in the U.S. courts. Id. The first opinion of the District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois in Zych states the facts of the case. Zych v. The Unidentified, Wrecked
& Abandoned Vessel, Believed To Be The SB "Lady Elgin," 746 F. Supp. 1334, 1336
(N.D. III. 1990), modified, 941 F.2d 525 (7th Cir. 1991), on remand, 811 F. Supp. 1300
(N.D. Ill. 1992), affd, No. 93-1426, 1993 WL 88377 (7th Cir. (Ill.) Mar. 21, 1994). In
1989 Harry Zych found the Lady Elgin, an 1851 sidewheel steamer, in Lake Michigan
after sixteen years of searching for her. Id. The ship perished on a trip from Chicago
to Milwaukee, carrying approximately four hundred passengers from a campaign rally
for presidential candidate Stephen Douglas. Id. After a collision during a storm, the
Lady Elgin sank in what has been coined the most famous shipwreck in the history of
the Great Lakes. Id. Over three hundred lives were lost in the calamity. Id.
Zych found the Seabird soon after his location of the Lady Elgin. Id. at 1337. The
Seabird also sank in Lake Michigan in 1868. Id. Originally, the court consolidated
Zych's claim to both of the ships. Id. Plaintiff formed the Lady Elgin Foundation which
entered into an agreement with CIGNA Property & Casualty Company ("CIGNA"),
which insured the ship and had a claim of ownership in the vessel, giving the Founda-
tion complete title to the wreck in exchange for twenty percent of the proceeds. Id.
Because the issues raised by the Lady Elgin now differed due to CIGNA's property inter-
est, the court vacated its consolidation order. Id. at 1338. The district court dismissed
the plaintiffs claim for a declaration of title for lack of jurisdiction. Id.
In Zych, the plaintiffs argued that the ASA impermissibly changed federal admiralty
jurisdiction. Id. at 1344. The court held, however, that the ASA was constitutional. Id.
at 1344-45. The district court upheld the constitutionality of the ASA for two reasons.
Id. First, the ASA did not abrogate federal jurisdiction over admiralty because it only
alters substantive law and does not take away the power of the federal courts to "resolve
questions concerning application of that law." Id. at 1345 (footnote omitted). Second,
the court held that the ASA does not violate uniformity principles of maritime law. Id.
at 1348. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court
had applied an improper standard for determining the ASA's constitutionality. Zych v.
Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, Believed To Be The "Seabird," 941 F.2d
525, 528 (7th Cir. 1991), modifying 746 F. Supp. 1334 (N.D. III. 1990), on remand, 811 F.
Supp. 1300 (N.D. I11. 1992), ajfd, No. 93-1426, 1993 WL 88377 (7th Cir. (Ill.) Mar. 21,
1994). The Court of Appeals saw the two pertinent issues to be whether the ASA ap-
plied to the shipwreck and whether it was constitutional. Id. at 530. In order for the
ASA to apply to the wreck, the court held that it was necessary for the district court to
make a finding that the wreck was indeed "embedded" pursuant to § 5(a). Id. The
appellate court found that the district court's description of the ship as "likely embed-
ded" was not enough to trigger the ASA. Id. The Court of Appeals ordered the district
court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the Seabird was "firmly af-
fixed." Id.
As to the constitutionality of the ASA, the court stated that the district court must
determine whether cases involving abandoned shipwrecks "[were] properly, firmly
within the scope of admiralty jurisdiction prior to the ASA." Id. at 531. The court
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a. Purpose and Overview of the ASA Provisions
The ASA's purpose is to establish the state's supremacy in
rejected the district court's understanding of the ASA that federal courts would still
hear abandoned shipwreck cases. Id. Instead, the court determined that the purpose
of the ASA was to change the forum for abandoned shipwrecks from the federal to the
state courts. Id. The court stated, "[d]epriving those who find embedded shipwrecks of
causes of action based on the law of salvage and the law of finds divests federal courts of
their admiralty jurisdiction over such claims, and concurrently vests state courts with
jurisdiction over the same claims." Id.
The court determined that Congress' removal of historic shipwrecks from the fed-
eral courts' exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime matters would be permis-
sible only if the district court could hold that the ASA did not remove "a thing falling
clearly within" admiralty law. Id. (citing Panama R.R v.Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924)).
The court identified the two lines of reasoning that the district court could follow to
determine the constitutionality of the ASA. Id, The first is that admiralty law is primar-
ily concerned with maritime commerce. Id. at 531. The second is that the Supreme
Court has implicitly accepted the existence of such jurisdiction. Id. at 532.
The district court, on remand, held that the ASA did not unconstitutionally alter
the federal court's exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty claims because regulating his-
toric shipwrecks is not a central concern of admiralty law. Zych v. The Unidentified,
Wrecked, & Abandoned Vessel, Believed To Be The SB "Seabird," 811 F. Supp. 1300,
1306 (N.D. IlI. 1992), affd, No. 93-1426, 1993 WL 88377 (7th Cir. (Ill.) Mar. 21, 1994).
The district court on remand held that the standard for determining constitutionality
was whether the management of historic wreck sites is a central concern to admiralty.
Id. The court held that regulating abandoned shipwrecks was not related to maritime
commerce and laws developed to govern maritime commerce have been stretched to fit
claims to historic shipwrecks. Id. at 1307. In terms of salvage law, the court held that its
elimination passed constitutional muster because shipwrecks falling under the ASA
must be abandoned. Id. at 1309. Because courts prefer finds over salvage, they would
not apply salvage in an instance where a claim was brought for a shipwreck with no
outstanding ownership claim. Id. If the shipwreck is not abandoned, then the ASA
does not apply. Id. at 1311 n.9. Finds law, which the court admitted was an aspect of
admiralty law, was not altered by the ASA. Id. at 1313. The court stated, however, that
the "Act does not remove from federal jurisdiction any significant federal function that
rested with the federal courts in abandoned shipwreck litigation prior to the Act." Id. at
1314. Because the ASA only applied to shipwrecks "embedded" in the territorial lands
of the state, this exception from the law of finds necessarily meant that the state could
obtain title to the wreck in spite of the ASA. Id
The Seventh Circuit heard the case on appeal from the district court for the sec-
ond time. Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, Believed To Be The
"Seabird," No. 93-1426, 1994 WL 88377 (7th Cir. (Ill.) Mar. 21, 1994), afg 811 F. Supp.
1300 (N.D. Ill. 1992). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the
ASA was constitutional. Id. at *6. The court held that the ASA's removal of abandoned
historic shipwrecks from the law of finds did not impermissible alter admiralty jurisdic-
tion. Id. at *4. The court stated that because the ASA only applies to shipwrecks that
are abandoned, it does not have any affect on the law of salvage. Id. The court also
held that even though Zych wanted to bring a claim for a salvage reward against the
State of Illinois, the owner of the shipwreck under the law of finds, the Eleventh
Amendment would bar the suit. Id. at *5. Because the Eleventh Amendment bars suits
against the states, absent their consent, Zych could not request a salvage reward from
Illinois. Id.
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regulating the excavation of state land in order to recover aban-
doned shipwrecks.'84 The ASA removes the responsibility to ad-
minister archaeological sites from federal courts and gives this
duty to the individual states.' 5 In enacting the ASA, Congress
recognized that the states are in the best position to oversee and
manage historic shipwrecks found in the Territorial Sea because
the states have a large responsibility to administer the national
historic preservation program 186 according to :the National
Historic Preservation Act of 1966187 ("NHPA"). The NHPA set
out the federal government's historic preservation policy and
established measures that enable preservation of the nation's
historic resources. 188
The ASA furthers the states' preservation responsibility by
184. See Giesecke, supra note 7, at 382. The author also notes that the ASA will
decrease the cost of litigation that has accrued due to the current uncertainty in the
federal courts over this issue. Id.
185. Id. at 388.
186. National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 ("NHPA"), 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470x-6
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (establishing national historic preservation program). The
NHPA provides the states' roles in § 470a(b) (3):
It shall be the responsibility of the State Historic Preservation Officer to ad-
minister the State Historic Preservation Program and to -
(A) in cooperation with Federal and State agencies, local governments,
and private organizations and individuals, direct and conduct a compre-
hensive statewide survey of historic properties and maintain inventories of
such properties;
(B) identify and nominate eligible properties to the National Register
and otherwise administer applications for listing historic properties on
the National Register;
(C) prepare and implement a comprehensive statewide historic preserva-
tion plan;
(D) administer the State program of Federal assistance for historic pres-
ervation within the State;
(E) advise and assist, as appropriate, Federal and State agencies and local
governments in carrying out their historic preservation responsibilities;
(F) cooperate with the Secretary, the Advisory Council on Historic Pres-
ervation, and other Federal and State agencies, local governments, and
organizations and individuals to ensure that historic properties are taken
into consideration at all levels of planning and development;
(G) provide public information, education, and training and technical
assistance relating to the Federal and State Historic Preservation Pro-
grams; and
(H) cooperate with local governments in the development of local his-
toric preservation programs and assist local governments in becoming
certified pursuant to subsection (c) of this section.
Id. § 470a(b) (3).
187. Id.
188. See id. §§ 470-471.
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directing the states to manage the recovery of historic ship-
wrecks. In Section 2101189 of the ASA, Congress mandates that
states are responsible for managing living and non-living re-
sources found in state waters and in submerged lands. Section
2101 includes shipwrecks as part of these resources. 190 In addi-
°tion, the ASA grants the United States title191 to any shipwreck
that is embedded 9 2- in the submerged lands of a state,' embed-
ded in coralline formations protected by a state on submerged
lands of a state,194 or located on submerged lands of a state and
is included in or determined eligible for inclusion on the Na-
tional Register of Historic Places (the "National Register") .195
Section 2105(c) of the ASA transfers title of the shipwrecks speci-
fied in Section 2105(a) to the states in which they are located.'9 6
Pursuant to Section 2104, the U.S. Secretary of the Interior
must publish guidelines (the "Guidelines") to assist states in de-
veloping statutes to govern the rights between salvors and the
states.'97 The Guidelines include an extensive list of recommen-
dations on how states should manage historic shipwrecks.' 98
189. 43 U.S.C. § 2101(a) (1988).
190. Id. § 2101(b).
191. Id. § 2105(a). But see id. § 2105(d) (granting title of any abandoned ship-
wreck in or on Indian lands to the Indian tribe owning such lands).
192. See id. § 2101(a). "Embedded" is defined in § 2102(a) of the ASA as "firmly
affixed in the submerged lands or in coralline formations such that the use of tools of
excavation is required in order to move the bottom sediments to gain access to the
shipwreck, its cargo, and any part thereof." Id.
193. Id. § 2105(a)(1). Section 2105(a)(1) states, "The United States asserts tide to
any abandoned shipwreck that is... embedded in submerged lands of a State.... " Id.
194. Id. § 2105(a)(2). Section 2105(a) (2) states, "The United States asserts title to
any abandoned shipwreck that is... embedded in coralline formations protected by a
State on submerged lands of a State . . . . " Id.
195. Id. § 2105(a) (3). Section 2105(a) (3) states, "[t]he United States asserts title to
any abandoned shipwreck that is... on submerged lands of a State and is included in
or determined eligible for inclusion in the National Register. . . . " Id. The National
Register of Historic Places is a comprehensive list of districts, sites, buildings, structures,
and objects significant in American history, architecture, archaeology, engineering and
culture. 36 C.F.R. § 60.1 (1993). The primary purpose of the National Register is to
help plan for the protection of historic resources in the United States. Id. § 60.2.
196. 43 U.S.C. § 2105(c) (1988). Section 5(c) states, "[t]he title of the United
States to any abandoned shipwreck asserted under subsection (a) of this section is trans-
ferred to the State in or on whose submerged lands the shipwreck is located." Id.
197. Id. § 2104(c); see supra note 7 (stating that Secretary of the Interior published
Guidelines in Federal Register).
198. See Guidelines, supra note 7, at 50,122-25 (listing recommendations for state
historic abandoned shipwreck programs). The Guidelines also include recommenda-
tions to assist the Federal government in managing shipwrecks located on federal pub-
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These recommendations, for example, include what professional
archaeology standards states should require of salvorst 99 and cre-
ative ways of developing incentives for locating shipwrecks.20
Section 2106 of the ASA states that the law of salvage and
finds does not apply to shipwrecks covered by the ASA.201 The
ASA's legislative history explains that the intention of Congress
was to prevent admiralty courts from obtaining jurisdiction over
abandoned historic shipwrecks. 20 2 Specifically, Congress stated
that the laws of salvage could result in the loss of historical infor-
mation and artifacts to the public. 3
b. Determining Historic Significance of Shipwrecks
The ASA covers shipwrecks that are embedded in the sub-
merged lands of a state, embedded in the coralline formations
of a state, or that are eligible to be listed in the National Regis-
ter.20 4 As a result, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit in Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, Believed
to Be The SB "Seabird" found that the ASA sets out two methods of
determining historic significance of shipwrecks in territorial wa-
ters.20 5 The court first held that "embeddedness" is an indicia of
historic significance.2 °6 Second, the court held that if the ship-
wreck is eligible to be listed in the National Register, then it is
historically significant under the ASA. °7
The NHPA authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to ex-
lic lands. Id. at 50,125-27. Finally, the Guidelines explain methods of funding ship-
wreck programs, surveying and identifying shipwrecks, documenting and evaluating
shipwrecks, providing for public and private sector recovery of shipwrecks, providing
public access to shipwrecks, interpreting shipwreck sites, establishing volunteer pro-
grams, and creating underwater parks. Id. at 50,128-38.
199. Id. at 50,124.
200. Id. at 50,128-29 (including Guideline 11 that implies that government may
offer contracts to commercial salvors).
201. 43 U.S.C. § 2106(a) (1988).
202. See House Report, supra note 89, at 366.
203. See id. (stating that problem with salvage law is loss of historical material).
204. 43 U.S.C. § 2105(a) (1988).
205. Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, Believed To Be The SB
"Seabird," 941 F.2d 525, 529 (7th Cir. 1991), modifying 746 F. Supp. 1334 (N.D. Ill.
1990), on remand, 811 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ill. 1992), aff'd, No. 93-1426, 1993 WL 88377
(7th Cir. (Ill.) Mar. 21, 1994).
206. Id. The Seventh Circuit stated, "[i] n the ASA, the concept of "embeddedness"
serves as a proxy for historic value." Id
207. 43 U.S.C. § 2105(a) (3) (1988); see supra note 195 (explaining that shipwrecks
listed in National Register are covered under ASA if on submerged lands of state).
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pand and maintain a National Register of districts, sites, build-
ings, structures, and objects significant in American history, ar-
chitecture, archaeology, engineering and culture.2 0 8 The states
are responsible for nominating properties to the National Regis-
ter,2 °9 which is a planning tool that assists the government and
citizens in the protection of properties worthy of preservation °.2 1
Federal agencies must consider the impact on properties eligible
to or listed in the National Register when undertaking a project
such as the construction of a highway or a dam.1 In addition,
when a property is listed in the National Register, it becomes
eligible for Federal grants-in-aid for historic preservation and to
receive tax credits for rehabilitation. 2 A resource is eligible to
the National Register if it is more than 50 years old, has contrib-
uted to American history, is related to the lives of important indi-
viduals, is representative of a type or method of construction, or
may provide information about history or prehistory. 3
208. National Register of Historic Places, 36 C.F.R. § 60.1 (1993).
209. 36 C.F.R. § 60.6 (1993).
210. Id. § 60.2.
211. Id. § 60.2(a).
212. Id. § 60.2(c).
213. Id. § 60.4. The Criteria for Evaluation are:
National Register Criteria for Evaluation. The quality of significance in
American history, architecture, archaeology, engineering, and culture is pres-
ent in districts, sites, buildings, structures, and objects that possess integrity of
location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association and
(a) that are associated with events that have made a significant contribu-
tion to the broad patterns of our history; or
(b) that are associated with the lives of persons significant in our past; or
(c) that embody the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or
'method of construction, or that represent the work of a master, or that possess
high artistic values, or that represent a significant and distinguishable entity
whose components may lack individual distinction; or
(d) that have yielded, or may be likely to yield, information important in
prehistory or history.
Criteria Considerations. Ordinarily cemeteries, birthplaces, or graves of his-
torical figures, properties owned by religious institutions or used for religious
purposes, structures that have been moved from their original locations, re-
constructed historic buildings, properties primarily commemorative in nature,
and properties that have achieved significance within the past 50 years shall
not be considered eligible for the National Register. However, such proper-
ties will qualify if they are integral parts of districts that do meet the criteria or
[sic] if they fall within the following categories:
(a) A religious property deriving primary significance from architectural
or artistic distinction or historical importance; or
(b) A building or structure removed from its original location but which
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c. Incentives Available for Recovering Historic Shipwrecks
The ASA removes historic shipwrecks from the maritime
rules of salvage and finds, but does not preclude a salvor from
being compensated for recovery efforts. 214 The states, through a
contracting, licensing, or permitting process, may agree with sal-
vors that they deserve compensation for locating, salvaging, and
documenting a historic shipwreck. 21  As opposed to salvage law,
a salvor under the ASA must meet professional standards in re-
covery methods in order to receive compensation. 216 Finally, an
is significant primarily for architectural value, or which is the surviving struc-
ture most importantly associated with a historic person or event; or
(c) A birthplace or grave of a historical figure of outstanding importance
if there is no appropriate site or building directly associated with his produc-
tive life.
(d) A cemetery which derives its primary significance from graves of per-
sons of transcendent importance, from age, from distinctive design features,
or from association with historic events; or
(e) A reconstructed building when accurately executed in a suitable envi-
ronment and presented in a dignified manner as part of a restoration master
plan, and when no other building or structure with the same association has
survived; or
(f) A property primarily commemorative in intent if design, age, tradi-
tion, or symbolic value has invested it with its own exceptional significance; or
(g) A property achieving significance within the past 50 years if it is of
exceptional importance.
Id.
214. See the Guidelines, supra note 7, at 50,132-35. The Guidelines recommend
that states encourage both public and private sector recovery of shipwrecks. Id. In
particular, the Guidelines state that a state may award title of artifacts to private salvors,
if it is in the public interest. Id. at 50,134-35.
215. Id.
216. See id. at 50,134. The Guidelines state that a professional manner in the study
and recovery of historic shipwrecks includes the following I
(a) The permittee, licensee or contractor has secured any other necessary
State or Federal permits;
(b) A professional underwater archaeologist is in charge of planning, con-
ducting and supervising the field operations, laboratory analysis, and report
preparation;
(c) A conservation laboratory is in place prior to commencement of filed op-
erations and a professional nautical conservator is in charge of planning, con-
ducting and supervising the conservation of any artifacts and other materials
recovered from the site;
(d) Field operations, laboratory analyses, and conservation treatments use ap-
propriate scientific methods and techniques and are as non-destructive and
non-disturbing as possible to the site, the surrounding environment, and any
artifacts and other materials recovered from the site;
(e) The shipwreck site is fully documented (i.e., an archaeological site map is
prepared, measured drawings are made of significant features, and a photo-
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individual who does not comply with shipwreck recovery stan-
dards could face civil or criminal penalties if a state imple-
mented recommendations included in the Guidelines. 17
II. INTERPRETATIONS OF UNCLOS III MARINE
ARCHAEOLOGY PROVISIONS
Despite the fact that commentators have maintained that ar-
graphic record is made of the wrecked vessel, significant features, and arti-
facts);
(f) A professional final report is prepared (and approved by the State) that
describes the field operations, excavation methods, laboratory analyses, con-
servation treatments, scientific findings, and recommendations for any future
work;
(g) Copies of all field notes, site maps, measured drawings, photographs,
videos, final reports, and other data and records derived from the recovery
and analysis are deposited, stored and maintained in the repository named in
the permit, license or contract;
(h) Copies of final reports, site maps and other appropriate records are pro-
vided to the State's historic preservation office and the underwater archaeol-
ogy office (or archaeology office, in the absence of an underwater archaeology
office);
(i) When the State is maintaining ownership to any artifacts or other materi-
als recovered from the site, those items are deposited, stored and maintained
in the repository named in the permit, license or contract;
(j) When the State is transferring ownership to any artifacts or other materials
recovered from the site to a commercial salvor or treasure hunter:
(1) The transfer is made only after field operations and laboratory analysis are
completed, the recovered items are conserved, and the final report is ap-
proved by the State; and
(2) To the extent possible, the items transferred are preserved and main-
tained as an intact collection and are made available for future study, public
interpretation and exhibition;
(k) When a commercial salvor or treasure hunter is undertaking the recovery,
the salvor or treasure hunter posts a performance bond to cover costs associ-
ated with the recovery (this is to ensure that sufficient funds would be avail-
able to the State if the salvor or treasure hunter is unable to complete the
recovery according to the terms and conditions of the permit, license or con-
tract); and
(1) Information on the recovery activity and the archaeological findings are
disseminated to the scientific community and to the public.
Id.
217. Id. at 50,124-25. The Guidelines call for prosecution of individuals who will-
fully damage or vandalize state-owned shipwrecks or otherwise violate the state's ship-
wreck management program according to state laws and regulations governing state-
owned property. Id. at 50,124. The Guidelines also recommend criminal fines and civil
penalties to be proportional to the nature of the violation, increase with subsequent
convictions, and include community service in the management of shipwrecks. Id.
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ticles 149218 and 303219 of UNCLOS III regarding marine archae-
ology are vague,220 these commentators also contend that ratifi-
cation of the Convention would still alter the existing law gov-
erning the discovery of historic shipwrecks. 221 By examining the
preparatory documents, or travaux preparatoires,222 of the Con-
vention, commentators have interpreted how the marine archae-
ology articles will change the law.223 Specifically, commentators
have analyzed the legislative history of UNCLOS III to determine
which shipwrecks qualify for special treatment, who has property
rights to those shipwrecks, and what the incentives should be to
locate them.
218. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (explaining that Article 149 of UN-
CLOS III addresses archaeological and historical objects found in Area).
219. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text (explaining that Article 303 of
UNCLOS III deals with marine archaeology in Contiguous Zone and Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone, and on Continental Shelf).
220. See Nafziger, supra note 1, at 346 (stating that, "[w]hat eventually emerged at
UNCLOS III ... is murky.").
221. See Arend, supra note 8, at 781-87 (discussing how UNCLOS I left marine
archaeology unregulated, with exception of coastal nation's sovereignty in Territorial
Sea). UNCLOS III is the first treaty with marine archaeology provisions. Newton, supra
note 10, at 166. Because the law of salvage and finds ruled international marine archae-
ology prior to UNCLOS III by virtue of the notion of freedom of the high seas, UN-
CLOS III effected the international law of marine archaeology. Id.
222. See Arend, supra note 8, at 782 n.22 (explaining that 1969 Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties specifically provides that travaux preparatoires provide clarifica-
tion of ambiguous treaties); Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, opened for signa-
ture May 23, 1969, arts. 31-32, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M.
679 (1969), entered into force Jan-. 27, 1980.
223. See, e.g., Oxman, supra note 8; Strati, supra note 8; Arend, supra note 8;
Newton, supra note 10. For the best chronicle of the legislative history of Article 149,
see Strati, supra note 8, at 874. The first step in the negotiation process that produced
travaux preparatoires for Article 149 was the Sea-bed Committee in 1970. Id. at 874-77.
During the years 1971-73, both Greece and Turkey submitted proposals to Subcommit-
tee I of the Seabed Committee, however the Seabed Committee did not finalize Article
149. Id. UNCLOS III continued the debate on marine archaeology. Id. at 876-77. The
1975 Geneva session produced the Informal Single Negotiating Text ("ISNT"). Id. at
876. The 1976 New York session produced the Revised Single Negotiating Text
("RSNT"). Id. Finally, the Final Draft of the Convention came at the 1980 Geneva
session. Id. at 877.
The legislative history for Article 303 was concentrated in the latter part of the
1970s. See Arend, supra note 8, at 793-99. During the eighth session of the Convention
in 1979, there were various delegation proposals to modify Article 303. Id. at 793-94.
Similarly, during the ninth session in 1980, there were further modifications to the
provision. Id. at 794-97.
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A. Determination of Archaeological Significance Under
Articles 149 and 303
The Convention's marine archaeology provisions, articles
149 and 303, do not define "objects of archaeological and histor-
ical nature." 24 National laws typically include age as a qualifica-
tion for an artifact to be considered worthy of preservation.2
Although the initial proposal for Article 149 included a thresh-
old of fifty years,226 this provision was deleted later in the negoti-
ation process 227 leaving the text of the Convention without any
date guideline. 22 ' As a result, one commentator suggested that
artifacts must be centuries old to qualify as archaeological and
historical.2 29  Another commentator suggested that the date
224. UNCLOS III, supra note 16, art. 149 & 303, 21 I.L.M. at 1295 & 1326.
225. See Strati, supra note 8, at 873 n.39 (listing ages of artifacts that qualify under
national heritage laws).
226. See Arend, supra note 8, at 790. A Sub-Committee of the Seabed Committee
submitted a proposal stating, "It] he recovery and disposal of wrecks and their contents
more than [fifty] years old found in the area shall be subject to regulation by the Au-
thority without prejudice to the rights of the owner thereof." Id.
227. See Arend, supra note 8, at 792. The RSNT simplified the article and stated
[a]li objects of an archaeological and historical nature found in the area shall
be preserved or disposed of for the benefit of the international community as
a whole, particular regard being paid to the preferential rights of the state or
country of origin, or the state of cultural origin, or the state of historical and
archaeological origin.
Id.
228. Strati, supra note 8, at 877. The Final Draft of the Convention, produced at
the Geneva session in 1980, changed the RSNT by substituting the words "benefit of
mankind as a whole" for "benefit of the international community as a whole" in Article
149, but did not insert a date guideline. Id.
229. Oxman, supra note 8, at 364-65 (quoting Bernard H. Oxman, The Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Ninth Session (1980), 75 Am. J. Irr'L L. 211,
241 n.152 (1981). Oxman observed:
The provision is not intended to apply to modern objects whatever their
historical interest. Retention of the adjective "historical" was insisted upon by
Tunisian delegates, who felt that it was necessary to cover Byzantine relics that
might be excluded by some interpretations of the word "archaeological."
Hence, the term "historical origin," lacking at best in elegance, when used
with the term "archaeological objects" in an article that expressly does not
affect the law of salvage, does at least suggest the idea of objects that are many
hundreds of years old. [The word "origin" was subsequently deleted by the
Conference Drafting Committee.]
The article contains no express time limit. As time marches on, so does
our sense of what is old, Nevertheless, given the purpose for using the term
"historical," it may be that if a rule of thumb is useful for deciding what is
unquestionably covered by this article, the most appropriate of the years con-
ventionally chosen to represent the start of the modem era would be 1453: the
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guideline should be a period of 100 to 200 years because most
nations use this time period as a criteria for protection of under-
water remains.230 Others have recommended that an interpreta-
tion of the Convention should include the fifty year standard.231
B. Property Rights to Shipwrecks Found in International Waters
The Convention defines ownership of discovered artifacts
according the area in which they are found.232 Articles 149 and
303 of UNCLOS III address different geographic regions of the
high seas.233 Article 149 focuses on ownership rights within the
Area.23 4 Article 303 covers the Contiguous Zone, the Exclusive
Economic Zone, and the Continental Shelf.235
1. Property Rights in the Area
While Article 149 does not explicitly state that the law of
finds rules the discovery of historic shipwrecks in the Area,236
commentators have suggested that the law of finds237 is implied
because there is no alternative ownership principle delineated in
the provision.238 These commentators argue that the only ap-
fall of Constantinople and the final collapse of the remnants of the Byzantine
Empire. Everything older would clearly be regarded as archaeological or his-
torical. A slight adjustment to 1492 for application of the article to objects
indigenous to the Americas, extended perhaps to the fall of Tenochtitlfin
(1521) or Cuzco (1533) in those years, might have the merit of conforming to
historical and cultural classifications in that part of the world.
Id.
230. Strati, supra note 8, at 873 n.39 (time limits provided by general heritage
legislation in most countries is approximately 100 to 200 years). The author notes that
these age standards aim to include artifacts that are of more recent history. Id. at 874
(stating that it would be unfortunate if UNCLOS III included "old-fashioned" under-
standing of marine archaeology by allowing preservation of only "very old" artifacts).
231. See Newton, supra note 10, at 177-78 (explaining that Titanic would qualify
under Article 149 of UNCLOS III with a fifty year standard because drafters' original
intent was to include this standard for objects of historical and archaeological nature);
see also Del Bianco, supra note 4, at 174 (stating that specific time limit of fifty years
could be used to avoid subjective determination of historic significance and be used
also for time limit that terminated ownership rights).
232. See UNCLOS III, supra note 16, arts. 149 & 303, 21 I.L.M. at 1295 & 1326.
233. Id.
234. Id. art. 149, 21 I.L.M. at 1295.
235. Id. art. 303, 21 I.L.M. at 1326.
236. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text (explaining definition of Area
according to UNCLOS III).
237. See supra notes 98-119 and accompanying text (explaining law of finds).
238. See Nafziger, supra note 1, at 348; cf. Newton, supra note 10, at 193 (stating
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parent duty that Article 149 imposes on nations is to cooperate
to preserve significant shipwrecks.23 9 The law of finds, however,
will determine ownership.2 40 Although the law of finds provides
one solution to ownership disputes in the Area, other commen-
tators have noted that vesting title in the finder of property lost
at sea is inconsistent with the primary concern of the Seabed
Committee,241 which was providing maximum international con-
trol over the area beyond a coastal nation's control. 42
In order to achieve international control over the deep sea-
bed, the Seabed Committee suggested the Authority243 oversee
activities in the Area. 44 One proposal included in the legislative
history of the Convention suggested that the Authority have ju-
risdiction over marine archaeology, 245 however the drafters de-
leted this provision.2 46 Although marine archaeology is admit-
that under Article 149, law of finds governs discovery of historic shipwrecks but that
owner must defer to state of origin).
239. See Nafziger, supra note 1, at 346 (arguing that because there is no agency
included in Article 149, provision's purpose is to rely on goodwill of nations). The
United States took this approach with the Titanic. See generally Lindbloom, supra note 1
(explaining U.S. law mandating creation of RM.S. Titanic memorial). Congress en-
acted the R.M.S. Titanic Maritime Memorial Act of 1986 ("Titanic Act") in order to
designate the wreck as an international maritime memorial. 16 U.S.C. §§ 450rr-450rr-6
(1988). The Titanic Act aims to protect the scientific, cultural, and historical signifi-
cance of the shipwreck. Id. § 450rr(b)(2). However, salvors have removed artifacts
from the shipwreck in violation of this U.S. legislation. WilliamJ. Broad, Items on Titanic
Brought to U.S., N.Y. TIMEs, July 7, 1993, at All. Additionally, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has granted exclusive salvage rights over the Titanic to a
professional salvage company. See Marex Titanic, Inc. v. The Wrecked & Abandoned
Vessel, 2 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 1993).
240. See Nafziger, supra note 1, at 348.
241. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (explaining that U.N. General As-
sembly created Seabed Committee to confer on deep seabed).
242. See Arend, supra note 8, at 788.
243. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (explaining role of International
Seabed Authority).
244. Study of International Machiney: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/
AC.138/23 (1970), reprinted in Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and
the Ocean Roor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp.
No. 21, at 29, U.N. Doc. A/8021 (1970).
245. See Arend, supra note 8, at 788. Greece made the proposal that the Authority
oversee marine archaeology in the Area. Id. (citing U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC/1/L.25
(1975)). If the Authority controlled marine archaeology in the Area, the Authority
would decide preferential rights of state of origin and if state did not want to avail itself
of those rights, the Authority would dispose of objects conforming with the principle
that objects belong to the common heritage of mankind. See Altes, supra note 5, at 82.
246. See Arend, supra note 8, at 789-90 (stating that United States objected to Au-
thority's control over marine archaeology).
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tedly not within the Authority's control,247 there was an effort to
remove marine archaeology from the finds regime by providing
jurisdiction to an independent agency.248
The absence of Authority jurisdiction over marine archaeol-
ogy has prompted some commentators to suggest that in order
to best carry out the directive of Article 149, a different agency
should oversee the recovery of historic shipwrecks in the Area
and decide who owns them.249 Looking to the other terms used
in Article 149, a commentator noted that the provision has no
practical effect unless an agency is designated to implement it.250
For example, Article 149 states that archaeological artifacts must
be preserved for the "benefit of mankind as a whole."251 Also,
the drafters gave "preferential rights" 25 2 to the "state or country
of origin, state of cultural origin, or state of historical or
archaeological origin."253
According to some commentators, the principle that
archaeological artifacts should be preserved for the "benefit of
mankind as a whole" implies that there is a commonness of own-
ership and benefit of shipwrecks with archaeological signifi-
cance.2 4 Similarly, preferential rights suggest that one nation
has a priority, but that there are simultaneous rights in other
nations.255 Pursuant to these principles, commentators suggest
247. See Oxman, supra note 8, at 361 n.23. According to Article 136, which defines
the Authority's powers, the Authority does have jurisdiction over the "common heritage
of mankind," which does not include shipwrecks. Id.
248. See Arend, supra note 8, at 789.
249. See Strati, supra note 8, at 878 (stating that one option is to establish interna-
tional body to deal with protection of archaeological remains located on deep seabed
floor). One recommendation has been to appoint the United Nations Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Organization ("UNESCO") to oversee the international marine
archaeology regime. Id. A commentator has pointed out that UNESCO has the legisla-
tive and operative powers to do so, and has expressed an interest in underwater archae-
ology. Id. UNESCO's role is to protect and restore the world's imperished treasures.
See Don't Rush Back to UNESCO, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1993, at A18.
250. See Strati, supra note 8, at 878.
251. UNCLOS III, supra note 16, art. 149, 21 I.L.M. at 1295; see Nafziger, supra
note 1, at 346 (arguing that problem with Article 149 is absence of expert body to
ensure disposal of objects for "benefit of mankind as whole").
252. See Strati, supra note 8, at 886 (defining preferential rights as giving prefer-
ence to nation whose cultural heritage property in question is most closely linked).
253. UNCLOS III, supra note 16, art. 149, 21 I.L.M. at 1295.
254. See Strati, supra note 8, at 880-81.
255. Id. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Iceland), 1974 I.CJ. 3 (July 25) (explaining
meaning of preferential rights); Fisheries Jurisdiction (F.R.G. v. Iceland), 1974 I.CJ.
175 (July 25) (explaining meaning of preferential rights).
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that an international agency could be appointed as the "trustee"
for humanity, overseeing negotiations concerning the extent of
nations' rights to historic shipwrecks. 56 The agency would also
carefully supervise recovery operations to guarantee that
archaeological standards are satisfied. 57
2. Property Rights in the Contiguous Zone, the Exclusive
Economic Zone, and on the Continental Shelf
The legislative history of UNCLOS III reveals that negotia-
tions regarding Article 303258 included discussions of whether a
coastal nation's sovereign rights should be extended to the Ex-
clusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf because most
archaeological exploration occurs in these areas.2 59 The United
States opposed this "creeping" jurisdiction.2 60 As a result, the
drafters ultimately altered the early proposals of Article 303.61
256. See, e.g., Strati, supra note 8, at 880-84 (suggesting that agency could be
"trustee" for humanity).
257. See Nafziger, supra note 1, at 350; see also, Howard H. Shore, Note, Marine
Archaeology and International Law: Background and Some Suggestions, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
668, 681 (1972) (recommending establishment of International Marine Archaeological
Commission).
258. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text (discussing Article 303 of UN-
CLOS III).
259. See Arend, supra note 8, at 793 (citing Informal Proposal by Cape Verde,
Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Tunisia and Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/ln-
formal Meeting/43 (Aug. 16, 1979)). For example, Cape Verde, Greece, Italy, Malta,
Portugal, Tunisia and Yugoslavia sponsored a proposal during the eighth session of
UNCLOS III that stated
[t]he coastal State exercises sovereign rights over any object of purely
archaeological and historical nature on or under its continental shelf for the
purpose of research, salvaging, protection ad proper presentation. However,
the State or country of origin, or the State of cultural origin, or the State of
historical origin shall have preferential rights over such objects 'in case of sale
or any other disposal.
Id.
260. See id. at 795 (citing U.S. Delegation Report, Ninth Session of the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 34 (1980)). The United States re-
ported
[w]hile all nations recognize the importance of the need to protect objects of
an archaeological and historical nature, a seven-nation proposal to this effect
was not included in [an earlier draft] because it was perceived as having the
potential for upsetting the delicate balance between coastal state rights and
obligations and the rights and obligations of other States. The text was also
vague and, if adopted, could have led to disputes between States with no
guidelines as to how they might be resolved.
261. See id. at 793-99.
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While one early suggestion gave a coastal nation the right to ap-
ply its own laws regarding marine archaeology in the Exclusive
Economic Zone,262 the final version removed coastal nation sov-
ereignty from the language of the treaty.265
The final version demonstrates how resistance to the exten-
sion of a coastal nation's sovereignty led to a compromise. The
compromise avoided the creation of an "archaeological zone"
where a coastal nation would be permitted to apply its own laws
to protect historic shipwrecks.264 Paragraph 1 of Article 303 pro-
vides that in all areas of the high seas, nations have a duty to
protect objects of archaeological and historical significance.265
The United States was interested primarily in policing the area
directly adjacent to the Territorial Sea rather than allowing
coastal nation sovereignty throughout the Exclusive Economic
Zone.266 Accordingly, paragraph 2 allows coastal nation jurisdic-
tion over attempted removals of archaeological objects from the
Contiguous Zone by presuming that this action will violate cus-
toms, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary laws.2 67
The explicit referral to the Contiguous Zone in Article 303
leaves open whether a nation may obtain jurisdiction over
marine archaeology in the Exclusive Economic Zone and on the
Continental Shelf.268 Commentators have analyzed whether a
coastal nation could obtain jurisdiction over recovery of ship-
262. See id. at 796-97 (citing Informal Proposal by Greece, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/
GP/10 (Aug. 18, 1980)). During the ninth session of the UNCLOS III talks, the Greek
delegation proposed a draft that said:
1. All States have the duty to protect, in a spirit of cooperation, objects of
archaeological or historical value found in the marine environment.
2. Nothing in this Convention shall be deemed to prevent coastal States form
enforcing, in an exclusive manner, their own laws and regulations concerning
such objects up to a limit of 200 nautical miles form the baselines from which
the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, while respecting the rights of
identifiable owners.
3. The State or country of origin, or the State of cultural origin, or the State of
historical or archaeological origin of the object shall enjoy preferential rights
in case of sale or any other disposal resulting in its removal from the State
where it is situated.
Id.
263. See UNCLOS III, supra note 16, art. 303, 21 I.L.M. at 1326.
264. See Arend, supra note 8, at 799.
265. UNCLOS III, supra note 16, art. 303, 1 1, 21 I.L.M. at 1326. But see Newton,
supra note 10, at 192 (stating that Article 303 applies only in Contiguous Zone).
266. See Arend, supra note 8, at 798 n.98.
267. UNCLOS III, supra note 16, art. 303, 2, 21 I.L.M. at 1295.
268. See id.
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wrecks by virtue of Article 60, which provides for control over
artificial islands, installations, and structures in the Exclusive
Economic Zone.269 Similarly, a coastal nation has the exclusive
right to regulate drilling on the Continental Shelf for "all pur-
poses" according to article 81.270
If marine scientific research included marine archaeology,
coastal nations would have exclusive jurisdiction over marine ar-
chaeology in the Exclusive Economic Zone.271 Commentators,
however, generally agree that attempts to search for and recover
historic shipwrecks do not constitute marine scientific research
as defined in the Convention. 72 These commentators justify
their views on the grounds that the marine archaeology provi-
sions were added after the development of the provisions that
give a coastal nation the exclusive right to authorize and regu-
late marine scientific research in its Exclusive Economic Zone
and on its Continental Shelf.2 7 3  Second, commentators note
that marine scientific research, as defined in UNCLOS III, refers
to the search for knowledge about the natural marine environ-
ment.
27 4
269. See Oxman, supra note 8, at 369-70. Art. 60 allows control if the activity is for
.other economic purposes" and "interferes with exercise of rights of coastal state." UN-
CLOS III, supra note 16, art. 60, 21 I.L.M. at 1279.
270. See Oxman, supra note 8, at 370.
271. See UNCLOS III, supra note 16, art. 246, 21 I.L.M. at 1317. Article 246 states
in relevant part:
1. Coastal States, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, have the right to regu-
late, authorize and conduct marine scientific research in their exclusive eco-
nomic zone and on their continental shelf in accordance with the relevant
provisions of this Convention.
2. Marine scientific research in the exclusive economic zone and on the conti-
nental shelf shall be conducted with the consent of the coastal State.
3. Coastal States shall, in normal circumstances, grant their consent for
marine scientific research projects by other States or competent international
organizations in their exclusive economic zone or on their continental shelf to
be carried out in accordance with this Convention exclusively for peaceful
purposes and in order to increase scientific knowledge of the marine environ-
ment of the benefit of all mankind. To this end, coastal States shall establish
rules and procedures ensuring that such consent will not be delayed or denied
unreasonably....
Id.
272. See Strati, supra note 8, at 883; Oxman, supra note 8, at 366; Arend, supra note
8, at 801 n.111.
273. See Oxman, supra note 8, at 366.
274. Id. at 367. Article 243 states that marine scientific research includes the study
of "[p] henomena and processes occurring in the marine environment and the interrela-
tions between them." UNCLOS III, supra note 16, art. 243, 21 I.L.M. at 1316; see also,
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The legislative history is scant for the third paragraph of Ar-
ticle 303. This scarcity of legislative history adds to the ambiguity
of paragraph 3, which addresses property rights, stating that
nothing in Article 303 "affects" the law of salvage or other rules
of admiralty.2 75 There are two viewpoints on what the third para-
graph means. According to some commentators, UNCLOS III,
by virtue of this provision, embodies salvage law rules of title to
shipwrecks. 6 If there are any outstanding ownership rights to a
historic shipwreck, the salvor would be entitled to a salvage re-
ward from the owner. 77 If there is no existing owner, then the
law of finds applies and the salvor would obtain title to the
wreck.2
In contrast, the other viewpoint argues that the third para-
graph of Article 303 excludes salvage principles from the regula-
tions dealing with marine archaeology.279 This outlook takes
into account that salvage law does not adequately protect ship-
wrecks with archaeological or historical value.28 0  Recovery
methods are not regulated by traditional salvage law.281 A salvor
is awarded compensation regardless of whether the shipwreck is
sensitively dismantled or documented. 82 Under salvage law's
adjunct, the law of finds, title vests in the finder precluding pub-
Bernard H. Oxman, The Regime of Warships Under the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea, 24 VA.J. INT'L L. 809, 844-47 (1984).
275. UNCLOS III, supra note 16, art. 303, 1 3, 21 I.L.M. at 1326. Article 303, 1 3
also states that law regarding cultural exchanges and rights of identifiable owners are
not affected by the provision. Id.
276. Oxman, supra note 8, at 362 ("[provision] expressly negates any effect on rules
regarding title.").
277. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (stating that salvor is entitled to
salvage reward under salvage law). Alexander recommends that the salvage reward be
contingent on whether the salvor uses proper archaeological methods of recovery and
that the matter of a marine peril be settled as a matter of law. Alexander, supra note 14,
at 14-18.
278. See supra text accompanying note 99 (explaining rule of title for abandoned
property under law of finds).
279. See Arend, supra note 8, at 779-80 n.8.
280. See House Report, supra note 89, at 366 (stating salvage law does not protect
historic qualities of shipwrecks).
281. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text (discussing elements required
to establish salvage cause of action).
282. Id. But see supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text (discussing that some
courts have limited salvage reward when salvor did not take into account historical
value of shipwreck).
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lic ownership. 283 Commentators and courts have insisted, there-
fore, that salvage law does not protect historic shipwrecks for
public enjoyment.28 4
In addition to this policyjustification that salvage law should
not be applied to historic shipwrecks because recovery methods
are inconsistent with preservation values, commentators and
U.S. case law have addressed the legal reasons to exclude historic
shipwrecks from salvage law.285 First, U.S. courts have ques-
tioned if historic wrecks are subjects of admiralty because they
have an attenuated connection to maritime commerce. 86 Sec-
ond, U.S. courts do not agree whether shipwrecks are in a
marine peril. 28 7 Finally, although salvage law has been applied
to objects other than active ships, 288 the subjects of salvage are
generally items that could interfere with navigation.28 9 Ship-
wrecks are usually buried deep beneath the ocean surface and
therefore do not impede shipping ventures.2 90 Finally, due to
the length of time that historic shipwrecks have been lying at the
bottom of the sea, some U.S. courts questioned if historic ship-
wrecks could be subjects of salvage law.29 1 Because salvage law
only applies when there is an existing owner of the artifact,
historic shipwrecks may be too old for any person to claim title
to them.2 9
2
Paragraph 4 was added to Article 303 later than the article's
283. See supra text accompanying note 99 (stating that finder acquires title to
property under law of finds).
284. See supra note 14 (explaining why salvage law does not protect historic aban-
doned shipwrecks).
285. See Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, Believed To Be The
"Seabird," 941 F.2d 525 (7th Cir. 1991), modifying 746 F. Supp. 1334 (N.D. Ill. 1990), on
remand, 811 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ill. 1992), afTd, No. 93-1426, 1993 WL 88377 (7th Cir.
(Ill.) Mar. 21, 1994).
286. Id. at 531-32.
287. See supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text (setting forth two arguments
for whether abandoned shipwrecks are in marine peril).
288. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text (noting that salvage law has
been applied to floating logs and floating corpse).
289. See id.
290. See Broad, supra note 9 (stating that S.S. Central America was found over mile
and a half below surface).
291. Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. The Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing
Vessel, 569 F.2d 330, 337 (5th Cir. 1978).
292. See id. (stating that salvage law should not be applied to abandoned ship-
wrecks because it is impossible for there to be existing owner).
19941
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preceding portions. Paragraph 4 of Article 303293 states that UN-
CLOS III does not effect other international agreements con-
cerning archaeological and historical artifacts.294 Commentators
have interpreted this paragraph to mean that the law of the sea
should be consistent with the evolving law of international ar-
chaeology.295 Existing international archaeology agreements ap-
ply only within the territories of member nations, are therefore
not generally applicable to shipwrecks found at sea.2 96 Interna-
tional agreements, however, may provide insight into how to
treat archaeological artifacts found at sea, particularly with re-
gard to the issue of ownership.297
Another commentator suggests that this provision allows a
new agreement to be formed to fill gaps left by the marine ar-
chaeology provisions in UNCLOS 111.298 For example, if salvage
law does not apply to historic shipwrecks located in the Contigu-
ous Zone, the Exclusive Economic Zone, and on the Continental
Shelf, another regime must be organized. This approach ac-
knowledges the limited usefulness of Article 303 and encourages
further refinement of the law of shipwrecks found beyond the
Territorial Sea.
C. Incentives to Search for Shipwrecks Beyond Domestic Jurisdiction
In addition to deciding who owns historic shipwrecks, pro-
viding an incentive to search for and locate abandoned historic
shipwrecks beyond the territorial sea also is an essential part of a
293. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (explaining meaning of UNCLOS
III's Article 303 paragraph four).
294. See UNCLOS III, supra note 16, art. 303, 4, 21 I.L.M. at 1326. Paragraph
four states that UNCLOS III is "without prejudice to other international agreements
and rules of international law regarding the protection of objects of an archaeological
and historical nature." Id.
295. See Oxman, supra note 8, at 355 (stating that nations' duties to protect
archaeological objects are derived from law of sea and law of cultural artifacts).
UNESCO is responsible for several recommendations regarding cultural property and
international archaeology. See UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property,
Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 (1972), reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 289 (1971); UNESCO
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage,
Nov. 16, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1358 (1972); UNESCO Recommenda-
tion Concerning the Protection, at a National Level, of the Cultural and Natural Heri-
tage, Nov. 16, 1972, UNESCO Doc. 17 C/107 (1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1367 (1972).
296. See Strati, supra note 8, at 867-68.
297. Id.
298. See Arend, supra note 8, at 803.
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substantive law of international marine archaeology.'" Under
traditional salvage law, the reward is an inducement to discover
shipwrecks. 00 If salvage law applies, the reward entails monetary
compensation, but may include the entire vessel.3 0' If finds law
applies, the reward consists of tide to the wreck. 0 2 Therefore,
when the treasure amounts to one billion dollars worth of gold,
the incentive to recover a historic shipwreck clearly exists under
traditional admiralty principles. 3
From a professional salvage company's perspective, the eco-
nomics of salvage operations would preclude any salvage efforts
if no incentive were offered.30 4 Similarly, from a preservation-
ist's perspective, the lack of an incentive is equally problematic
because of limited public resources to search for and recover
wrecks.30° Commentators therefore have suggested that a re-
ward be made even if salvage law does not apply to historic ship-
wrecks.
For example, one commentator suggested that in the Area,
the agency3 0 6 appointed to oversee marine archaeology could
distribute an appropriate reward.3 °7 For shipwrecks found in the
Contiguous Zone, in the Exclusive Economic Zone, or on the
Continental Shelf, the incentive is a more problematic matter
because the issue of property rights is less settled than in the
299. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (stating that to effectively regulate
marine archaeology, incentives to locate shipwrecks must be offered).
300. See supra text accompanying note 122 (stating that reward is available to first
salvor that saves marine property from marine peril).
301. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. courts' combi-
nation of law of salvage and finds because under both principles remedy may be vessel
itself).
302. Id.
303. See Columbus-America Discovery Group, Inc. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 974
F.2d 450 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, - U.S. -., 113 S. Ct. 1625 (1993). But see Salvagers
Receive 90% of Treasure; Insurers, 10%, supra note 14 (stating that judge presiding over
salvage award proceedings believed that gold on board S.S. Central America amounted
only to U.S.$21 million).
304. See Salvagers Receive 90% of Treasure; Insurers, 10%, supra note 14 (stating that
salvors of S.S. Central America have spent U.S.$30 million on salvage effort thus far).
305. See Guidelines, supra note 7, at 50,128. The Guidelines state that, "[a]dequate
funding is the key to the successful operation of programs for the management of pub-
licly-owned shipwrecks." Id.
306. See supra notes 249-50 and accompanying text (discussing commentators'
views that international agency should be appointed to determine nations' rights to
wrecks).
307. See Strati, supra note 8, at 880-84.
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Area.30 8 Incentives are connected to property rights because if
salvage law or finds applies, either compensation or title is
awarded to the salvor, respectively.30 9
III. THE PRINCIPLES OF U.S. ABANDONED SHIPWRECK LAW
SHOULD BE INCORPORATED INTO AN
INTERPRETATION OF UNCLOS I
International law differs from a coastal nation's domestic
law.3 10 International law is based on the idea of comity and ne-
gotiation, while a nation's law is grounded on sovereign pow-
ers.3 1 Therefore, it is valid to question whether the use of do-
mestic legal principles should be applied to the interpretation of
an international treaty such as UNCLOS 1II.312 In the case of the
marine archaeology provisions of UNCLOS III, there is general
agreement that the articles dealing with historically significant
objects found at sea provide insufficient guidance for dealing
with historic shipwrecks. 13 The ASA represents an approach to
protecting historic shipwrecks that could be used to add detail
and substance to the broader principles spelled out in articles
149 and 303 of UNCLOS III.314 The finer points of an interna-
tional historic shipwreck law may be resolved relying on the dis-
pute resolution provisions of the Convention and by developing
an international marine archaeology agreement consistent with
the directives of UNCLOS III.31
308. See supra notes 258-98 and accompanying text (discussing property rights in
Contiguous Zone, in Exclusive Economic Zone, and on Continental Shelf).
309. See supra note 150 and accompanying text (discussing fact that title to vessel
may be awarded under law of salvage and finds).
310. See Oxman, supra note 8, at 355. Oxman stated that, "[t]he difference is that
the law of the sea may yield more options than, and pose problems different from,
those that arise from a terrestrial system rooted almost exclusively in territorial sover-
eignty." Id.
311. See id.
312. Cf id.
313. See supra note I (discussing inadequacy of international marine archaeology
law).
314. See supra note 22 (comparing detail of ASA and UNCLOS III).
315. See Arend, supra note 8, at 803. Due to its imminent ratification and because
UNCLOS III is an extensive treaty that deals with a plethora of ocean law matters, it is
unlikely that the United Nations would halt the ratification process to amend the
marine archaeology provisions of the Convention. Id. Article 303, paragraph 4 implies
that a new agreement is what the treaty calls for by referring to "other international
agreements." Id.
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A. Determining Historic Significance of Shipwrecks Found in
International Waters Should Be Based on the More
Encompassing Standard Included in the ASA
An interpretation of UNCLOS III should define significant
shipwrecks using a standard that recognizes recent history.3 16
Failing to use a fifty year threshold, the more encompassing stan-
dard, would exclude the Titanic and other important aspects of
U.S. history. 17 The legislative history of the Convention demon-
strates that nations considered a broader standard, but left the
language in the final draft open to interpretation."' 8 The U.S.
approach supports the use of a more inclusionary standard in
interpreting UNCLOS 111.119
During the UNCLOS III negotiations, the U.S. Delegation
recommended that only shipwrecks centuries old be considered
historically significant.3 20 This recommendation contradicts the
ASA, which incorporated the NHPA standard of requiring his-
torically significant objects to be fifty years old. 21 In addition,
even if the resource has not achieved significance in the past fifty
years, the property is eligible to be listed in the National Register
if it is exceptionally significant 22
The United States adopted a liberal standard for determin-
ing objects worthy of preservation in the NHPA.12' To sanction
316. See Nafziger, supra note 1, at 348 (explaining that Titanic was 73 years old
when it was discovered).
317. Id. A 50 year standard would ensure that World War II ships would be signifi-
cant. See Guidelines, supra note 97, at 50,141 (listing shipwrecks included on National
Register of Historic Places including U.S.S. Arizona and U.S.S. Utah, both of which sank
during Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941).
318. See notes 224-31 and accompanying text (discussing travaux preparatoires and
commentators' views on appropriate age standard to be included in UNCLOS III).
319. See supra text accompanying note 213 (stating U.S. age standard for historic
resources).
320. See supra note 229 and accompanying text (stating Oxman's observations re-
garding appropriate age for historic and archaeological resources under UNCLOS III).
321. 36 C.F.R. § 60.4 (1993).
322. Id. at Criteria Considerations (g).
323. See supra note 213 (stating Criteria for Evaluation for listing on National Reg-
ister). It is notable that age is not the sole consideration under U.S. law. Id. Interna-
tional law should take into account an object's integrity, its contribution to broad pat-
terns of history, any associations to the lives of significant persons the shipwreck may
have, and whether the shipwreck embodies the distinctive characteristics of a type, pe-
riod or method of construction. See id. Additionally, a criteria for consideration partic-
ularly relevant to historic shipwrecks would be whether the shipwreck has yielded or is
likely to yield, information important in prehistory or history. See id.
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any other standard would set an arbitrary line between a ship-
wreck found at twelve miles from the baseline, or within the Ter-
ritorial Sea,324 and one that was found just beyond this limit.3 2 5
The express purpose of the UNCLOS III maritime zones is to
organize the jurisdiction of coastal nations, not to define what
the international community views as shipwrecks worthy of pro-
tection. Therefore, shipwrecks both inside and outside the Ter-
ritorial Sea limits should be judged according to the same his-
toric significance standard. 2 6
B. An International Agency Should Be Appointed to Implement
Article 149
The travaux preparatoires demonstrate that the Authority
32 7
does not have jurisdiction over marine archaeological finds dis-
covered in the Area.328 While the Authority has the power to
distribute the "common heritage of mankind," which includes
the living and non-living resources located in the deep seabed,329
it does not have jurisdiction to resolve claims to archaeological
resources in the deep seabed.3 30 This result of the UNCLOS III
negotiations is unfortunate because in order for Article 149331 to
have effect, an agency must implement it.332 Therefore, the in-
ternational community should appoint an alternative agency to
be responsible for shipwrecks found in the Area.333
The best suggestion for the designation of an agency is that
the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organi-
zation ("UNESCO") be in charge of marine archaeology in the
324. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text (explaining that Territorial Sea
is measured at distance of twelve miles from baseline of coastal nation).
325. See, e.g., supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing historical purpose
of Contiguous Zone).
326. Id.
327. See supra note 67-68 and accompanying text (explaining that International
Seabed Authority controls activities taking place on deep seabed).
328. See supra text accompanying note 65 (discussing how UNCLOS III defines
Area as deep seabed).
329. See id.
330. See supra notes 243-48 and accompanying text (explaining that marine ar-
chaeology is not within Authority's control).
331. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (discussing Article 149 of UNCLOS
III).
332. See supra notes 243-57 and accompanying text (explaining why appointment
of agency is necessary to implement Article 149).
333. Id.
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Area. 3 4 UNESCO could take over these responsibilities easily
because it already has an international presence, deals specifi-
cally with archaeological matters, and makes recommendations
for international approaches to archaeology. 335 Moreover,
UNESCO has the advantage of being a structured organization
which could adapt to being accountable for resolving matters of
marine archaeology. 36
Pursuant to the dispute resolution provisions of the Conven-
tion, UNESCO would decide whether a shipwreck had historic
significance. As the trustee for humanity, UNESCO would have
the power to determine if a private individual would gain title to
a shipwreck or if the shipwreck should be preserved for the pub-
lic's benefit by being removed to a museum or cultural institu-
tion. All UNESCO determinations would be made in order to
benefit the public interest.
Giving jurisdiction to UNESCO over marine archaeology
would best serve the public interest by taking historic shipwrecks
out of the realm of salvage and finds law. Title would not neces-
sarily be granted to the individual who found the abandoned
historic shipwreck. 3 7 Also, under a system where by statute ship-
wrecks became abandoned after a period of fifty years, it would
be unlikely that salvage would apply at all to historic shipwrecks
because only the law of finds applies to abandoned shipwrecks,
not the law of salvage. 3 8
The language of UNCLOS III, including the phrases "for
the benefit of mankind as a whole" and "preferential rights" ar-
gues in favor of an independent organization making decisions
regarding historic shipwrecks rather than allowing title to be
334. Strati, supra note 8, at 878. While the United States withdrew from UNESCO
ten years ago, the State Department has recommended that the Clinton Administration
rejoin the organization. See Steven Greenhouse, Rejoining UNESCO Suggested to U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1993, at 5. The reasons given for rejoining is that it would help
American scientists, educators and corporations to cooperate in science, education, cul-
ture, and communications. Id.
335. Id.; see supra note 295 (listing UNESCO recommendations on international
archaeology and cultural property).
336. See Nafziger, supra note 1, at 351 (questioning need for another bureau-
cracy).
337. See id. at 350 (stating that there is increasing recognition that law of finds may
be law of losses); supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing why salvage law
should not be applied to historic shipwrecks).
338. See Del Bianco, supra note 4, at 174 (discussing French shipwreck law that
mandates that all wrecks left over period of five years are abandoned).
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granted to the finder.33 9 Without an agency to implement Arti-
cle 149, the law of finds would probably govern.140 The law of
finds excludes input by the international community over the
future of objects with historic significance. The designation of a
public body, however, could balance competing interests
thereby preserving objects of an archaeological and historical
nature for the "benefit of mankind as a whole."3 4'
U.S. law delegates to a government body the responsibility
of determining the fate of historic shipwrecks. 42 The ASA re-
quires the states to manage historic shipwrecks3 43 and rejects the
law of finds. 44 Therefore, U.S. law supports an interpretation of
Article 149, which would mandate an autonomous organization
to control marine archaeological matters in the Area.
C. The Proper Interpretation of Article 303 Is to Give Coastal Nations
Jurisdiction Over Marine Archaeology and to Exclude
Historic Shipwrecks from Salvage Law
In spite of the U.S. delegation efforts to avoid the creation
of national jurisdiction over marine archaeology beyond the Ter-
ritorial Sea, it is possible to interpret Article 303341 to include
marine archaeology within regimes that coastal nations already
have jurisdiction to regulate.346 A coastal nation's jurisdiction
arguably exists for the regulation of customs laws violations in
the Contiguous Zone, over drilling operations on the Continen-
tal Shelf, and over the installation of structures in the Exclusive
Economic Zone, all of which may affect marine archaeology
practices. 34 7 Once jurisdictional power is established, it is neces-
339. See supra notes 251-53 and accompanying text (discussing meaning of "benefit
of mankind as a whole" and "preferential rights").
340. See Nafziger, supra note 1, at 348. The author stated, "the applicable law of
the sea is itself at sea." Id.
341. See supra notes 243-57 and accompanying text (explaining role of agency that
would oversee marine archaeology in international waters).
342. See ASA, 43 U.S.C. § 2106(a) (1988).
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text (explaining that Article 303 of
UNCLOS III deals with marine archaeology in Contiguous Zone, in Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone, and on Continental Shelf).
346. See supra notes 269-70 and accompanying text (explaining that coastal nation
may obtain jurisdiction over marine archaeology in Exclusive Economic Zone and on
Continental Shelf by virtue of drilling provisions).
347. Id.
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sary to determine the details of coastal nation regulation to pro-
vide the most protection for historic shipwrecks. Following the
U.S. approach, the best method of protection is to define a re-
gime that treats historic shipwrecks outside of admiralty rules of
salvage and finds.348
1. In the Contiguous Zone, Art. 303, 2 Controls a Coastal
Nation's Jurisdiction, While in the Exclusive
Economic Zone the Drilling Provisions
Establish Jurisdiction
With the exception of the ability to assume that removal of
archaeological objects from a nation's Contiguous Zone consti-
tutes smuggling for the purposes of enforcing customs regula-
tions,349 coastal nations do not have jurisdiction over marine ar-
chaeology by virtue of the facial language of the marine archae-
ology provisions of the Convention.35 ° While it is arguable that
marine archaeology is not marine scientific research as defined
in the Convention,351 the suggestions regarding articles 60352
and 81311 could provide jurisdiction in the Exclusive Economic
Zone and on the Continental Shelf, respectively. Thus, a coastal
nation could regulate marine archaeology by incorporating rules
into its customs regulations, its laws regarding the installation of
structures, and regulations related to drilling.
2. Coastal Nations Should Exclude Historic Shipwrecks from
the Law of Salvage and Finds
Once it is established that a coastal nation may obtain juris-
diction over marine archaeology in the Contiguous Zone and
the Exclusive Economic Zone, and on the Continental Shelf, it is
348. See, e.g., House Report, supra note 89, at 366 (advocating that admiralty prin-
ciples of salvage and finds are not appropriate for historic abandoned shipwrecks be-
cause of resulting loss of historical data and artifacts).
349. See UNCLOS III, supra note 16, art. 303, 2, 21 I.L.M. at 1326.
350. See supra notes 258-68 and accompanying text (discussing facial language of
Article 303).
351. See supra notes 271-74 and accompanying text (discussing why marine archae-
ology does not come under marine scientific research provisions of UNCLOS III).
352. See supra note 269 and accompanying text (discussing how marine archaeol-
ogy could fall under Article 60 which allows coastal nation control over artificial islands,
installations, and structures in Exclusive Economic Zone).
353. See supra note 270 and accompanying text (discussing how marine archaeol-
ogy could fall under Article 81, which allows coastal nation to control drilling on Conti-
nental Shelf for any purpose).
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necessary to determine how these respective regulations could
incorporate marine archaeology to afford protection to historic
shipwrecks.354 A prerequisite to effectively regulating marine ar-
chaeology through regulatory strategy is to exclude historic ship-
wrecks from the law of salvage and finds.3 55 Freeing historic
shipwrecks from these principles would allow a broader range of
regulatory possibilities because coastal nations would not be con-
strained by the rules of title included in salvage and finds law.356
Pursuant to a viable interpretation of Article 303, paragraph
3,357 because historic shipwrecks are subjects of admiralty and
salvage law is based on the existence of an "identifiable owner,"
paragraph 3358 reveals that it does not challenge the supposition
that title to historic shipwrecks should be based on rules of admi-
ralty.359 This, however, is not the only possible interpretation. 3 1°
The fact that historic shipwrecks have been treated as subjects of
admiralty in the past does not preclude an alternative policy.361
It is possible to interpret paragraph 3 as excluding historic
shipwrecks from the admiralty rules."6 2 If the assumption is that
historic shipwrecks are not subjects of admiralty rules of salvage
and finds, creating new rules for title and recovery operations
would not effect the rights of identifiable owners, salvage law, or
other rules of admiralty. Rather, if the assumption is that
archaeological finds in international waters belong to nobody
and there is a priori right by the state of origin, there is a greater
range of possible regulatory solutions to preserve historic ship-
354. See supra note 4 (stating that marine archaeology regulations should maxi-
mize protection of historic shipwrecks and provide incentives to locate them).
355. See supra notes 280-84 and accompanying text (discussing how salvage law
from policy perspective does not protect historic shipwrecks).
356. See supra text accompanying notes 109-10 & 121-22 (discussing rules of title in
law of finds and salvage).
357. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing meaning of paragraph 3
of Article 303).
358. See id. (explaining that Article 303, paragraph 3 states that nothing in UN-
CLOS III affects admiralty principles).
359. See, e.g., Newton, supra note 10, at 194.
360. See Arend, supra note 8, at 779-80 n.8 (explaining that Article 303 of UN-
CLOS III excludes marine archaeological finds from the law of salvage).
361. See, e.g., ASA, 43 U.S.C. § 2106(a) (1988) (removing historic abandoned ship-
wrecks from the law of salvage and finds).
362. See Arend, supra note 8, at 779-80 n.8 (explaining that Article 303 of UN-
CLOS III excludes marine archaeological finds from law of salvage).
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wrecks and to deal with them in a way that benefits the interna-
tional community as a whole.
The United States has embraced this theory by excluding
historic shipwrecks from salvage and finds in the ASA. 6 ' The
U.S. Congress based this approach on the notion that historic
shipwrecks are not a part of admiralty because abandoned his-
toric shipwrecks are not related to maritime commerce.364 From
a policy perspective, the ASA recognizes that the value of preser-
vation is not furthered by salvage and finds law.365 This is true
because title goes to the finder or someone who has an owner-
ship interest in the wreck. 66 In addition, archaeological stan-
dards are not used in recovery methods. 67
Viewing historic shipwrecks as something distinct from ad-
miralty provides the opportunity to regulate in creative ways.
For example, the penalty for smuggling parts of a historic ship-
wreck out of the Contiguous Zone could include reverting title
of the object removed to the coastal nation. Because removal of
the object is inevitable at some point in the retrieval process,
unless a finder immediately informed the coastal nation's au-
thorities of the existence of the wreck and surrendered title to
them, that individual could be facing civil or criminal penalties.
In the Exclusive Economic Zone and on the Continental
Shelf, a coastal nation could regulate respectively the installation
of structures and drilling procedures by requiring a person wish-
ing to drill into a coastal nation's Continental Shelf or some-
where within the Exclusive Economic Zone to acquire a permit
from UNESCO in order to proceed. Failure to obtain a permit
could result in penalties by the coastal nation. While enforce-
ment would be the responsibility of the coastal nation through
the permitting process, UNESCO would oversee the recovery op-
erations and be the ultimate arbiter of title and a reward.
363. See ASA, 43 U.S.C. § 2106(a) (1988).
364. See House Report, supra note 89, at 366. The House Report stated that admi-
ralty law developed to encourage the salvage of commercial goods. Id. Also, the House
Report explained that salvage operations result in the loss of historical information and
artifacts. Id.
365. See supra notes 280-84 and accompanying text (describing policy behind ex-
cluding historic abandoned shipwrecks from law of salvage and finds).
366. See supra text accompanying notes 121-22 and accompanying text (discussing
rule of title under salvage law).
367. See supra note 14 (explaining that salvage law is not favored by preservationists
because it does not require archaeological standards to be met).
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D. Incentives Should Be Available to Encourage the Location of
Historic Wrecks Yet Made Contingent on the Use of
Archaeological Standards in Recovery Operations
The primary argument set forth for the retention of salvage
law to settle disputes regarding title to abandoned historic ship-
wrecks is that the salvage reward provides an incentive to locate
shipwrecks."' Salvage law proponents also point out that the
costs of salvage operations are generally exorbitant.3 69 Accord-
ingl , salvors are entitled to compensation either in the form of
monetary compensation or title to the shipwreck.
Although some U.S. courts have required the use of
archaeological expertise in salvage operations of historic ship-
wrecks,370 generally a salvor may use recovery methods that de-
stroy the historic value of the wreck.371 The salvage reward is not
made contingent on whether the shipwreck remains intact.37 2
Instead, a salvor may destroy the site and the historical informa-
tion it contains through the use of explosives, dredges or propel-
ler wash deflectors. 373  Thus, an important aspect of historic
preservation, the documentation of historic sites, is not achieved
under salvage law.3 74
The issue is not whether a salvor is entitled to compensa-
tion. Preservationists agree that salvors should be compen-
sated.3 75 However, in the case of international marine archaeol-
ogy, UNESCO should decide the proper reward. First, an incen-
368. See Newton, supra note 10, at 195 (stating that "article 303 fails to provide
salvage law's incentive of salvage reward."). Other commentators have noted the pro-
tection of priority, or the injunction stage, of salvage law that is critical to preserving
archaeological integrity by allowing the first salvor to complete recovery operations
without the interference by others. See Alexander, supra note 14, at 2-6 (explaining that
right of first salvor is important aspect of salvage law).
.369. See supra note 304 (explaining costs of salvage operations).
370. See supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text (discussing fact that some U.S.
courts have required salvors to show that they have used sensitive recovery methods to
receive salvage reward).
371. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 8, at 502 (stating traditional requirements for
salvage reward).
372. Id.
373. See, e.g., Guidelines, supra note 7, at 50,132 (explaining potentially harmful
salvage methods).
374. See id. at 50,131 (providing recommendations on documentation methods);
Broad, supra note 9 (explaining that new technologies used for salvage operations may
also be used to enhance documentation of historic shipwrecks).
375. See Guidelines, supra note 7, at 50,135 (providing system to assess when trans-
fer of title of artifacts to salvors is in public interest).
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tive should be available for providing notice of the location of a
shipwreck." 6 Second, after recovery operations are finished, ti-
ie or other compensation should be granted to the salvor when
appropriate recovery methods are used and such a reward is in
the public interest.37
E. The United States Should Ratify UNCLOS III and Should
Participate in Developing a New Agreement for
International Marine Archaeology
Because UNCLOS III has achieved its necessary sixty ratify-
ing votes without a U.S. ratifying vote, the United States could be
prohibited from participating in dispute resolution proceedings
as provided in the Convention."" Therefore, it is in the U.S.
interest to ratify UNCLOS 110" Because UNCLOS III has
achieved treaty status, to address the marine archaeology defi-
ciencies in the treaty, it is more difficult to amend the treaty
rather than to develop a new international agreement pertaining
to shipwrecks and other archaeological resources. 380
Settling controversies over ownership rights to historic ship-
wrecks in international waters could be handled by the dispute
resolution mechanisms already included in the treaty.38' Com-
pulsory dispute settlement is consistent with the concept of
376. See Del Bianco, supra note 4, at 173 n.106. Under the Australian system, a
salvor is entitled to a reward for reporting the wreck. Id.
377. See, e.g., Guidelines, supra note 7, at 50,135. The Guidelines state that States
should
(a) Not transfer title to any items to another party until the authorized recov-
ery activity is completed, the items are properly conserved and analyzed, and
any required final report is competed and approved by the State;
(b) Determine any archaeological and commercial values of recovered arti-
facts and other materials;
(c) Determine what would constitute fair compensation to the private party
(for his or her recovery efforts) in terms of a share of items recovered, a per-
centage (in cash) of the fair market value of the items, or a combination
thereof; and
(d) Retain title to items that are unique, exceptionally valuable historically or
representative of the items recovered, or are recovered illegally after enact-
ment of the State's shipwreck management statute.
Id.
378. See Oxman, supra note 8, at 371.
379. See id.
380. See Mend, supra note 8, at 803 (explaining that marine archaeology was not
priority during UNCLOS III negotiations).
381. See UNCLOS III, supra note 16, art. 280, 21 I.L.M. at 1322. Although one
commentator suggested that the Deep Seabed Dispute Chamber could settle these dis-
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"preferential rights," implying that negotiations are necessary to
settle questions of property rights.3 s2 Additionally, compulsory
dispute settlement could assist in developing precise interpreta-
tions of the Convention's rules and defining the states' obliga-
tions to protect archaeological and historical objects. 383
The development of a new agreement would be consistent
with the language of UNCLOS III.384 Paragraph 4 of Article
30385 provides the opportunity to create a new agreement that
better protects historic shipwrecks in international waters.3 86
Negotiations could proceed on regional bases. Most impor-
tantly, experts in the field of marine archaeology including ar-
chaeologists and professional salvagers could negotiate to de-
velop the best possible approach to preserving shipwrecks found
in international waters for the public benefit.3 87
CONCLUSION
Technological advances in undersea gear have encouraged
more extensive recovery of historic shipwrecks in international
waters.38 8 The existing international regime is currently inade-
quate to address preservation goals. Although UNCLOS III pro-
vides a framework for international marine archaeology, the
Convention's ambiguous provisions should be interpreted to in-
corporate principles delineated in the U.S. comprehensive ap-
proach to protecting historic shipwrecks. Applying U.S. aban-
doned shipwreck standards to the development of a new interna-
tional marine archaeology agreement will protect historic
putes, articles included in Part XV should be used because marine archeology is not an
'activity in the Area." Strati, supra note 8, at 885.
382. See Strati, supra note 8, at 884 (discussing Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases).
383. Oxman, supra note 8, at 371. The author also highlights the possibility that if
a nation does not ratify the treaty, it may be excluded from the dispute settlement
process. Id.
384. See id. (stating that dispute resolution provisions may be used to develop pre-
cise interpretations of marine archaeology provisions).
385. See UNCLOS III, supra note 16, art. 303, 4, 21 I.L.M. at 1326. Paragraph 4
states, "[t ] his article is without prejudice to other international agreements and rules of
international law regarding the protection of objects of an archaeological and historical
nature." Id.
386. See Arend, supra note 8, at 803 (calling for new international agreement to
address marine archaeology).
387. See id.
388. See supra note 9 (discussing technological progress in shipwreck recovery
methods).
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shipwrecks in international waters by fulfilling the general pro-
positions regarding marine archaeology set out in UNCLOS III.
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